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Abstract:  In the decades which followed the publication of AV Dicey’s Law of the 
Constitution, most English lawyers felt confident that the rights and liberties of Englishmen were 
protected by a rule of law, which was secured through ancient common law remedies such as the 
writ of habeas corpus.  In their view, this ensured that no political activists would be detained 
without trial, unless there were particular emergencies which allowed the writ’s suspension, in 
order to protect the very rule of law. At the same time that these arguments were being made, 
however, detention without trial became an increasingly routine feature of colonial governance. 
This article examines the attempts used by political detainees from different parts of the empire 
to challenge their rendition and detention, and explores what the judicial response tells us about 
perceptions of the rule of law in the era when Dicey’s work was establishing itself as the classic 
text of constitutional law. Focusing on a number of key cases, it examines how courts examined 
two central issues in habeas corpus cases. The first concerns the legality of the detention. In 
discussing this issue, courts were presented with rival approaches to the rule of law, one which 
was more ‘formalist’ (asking whether the legislative instrument ordering the detention had a 
valid pedigree derived from the sovereign legislature), and another which was more ‘substantive’ 
(invoking a notion of fundamental rights). The second concerns the question of control, and 
explores the response of the courts to challenges to the writ by defendants who argued that they 
no longer had control over the detainee. 
 
 
———— 
 
The writ of habeas corpus has long been held to be central to English notions of liberty and the 
rule of law. ‘[F]ounded on the broad basis of Magna Charta’ (as Henry Hallam described it),1 it 
was seen by generations of nineteenth-century lawyers and historians as a vehicle to secure ‘the 
fundamental articles ... of the common law.’2 It assumed a prominent position in the work of 
Albert Venn Dicey, who famously balanced an Austinian view of parliamentary sovereignty, 
according to which the formal validity of all laws had to be traced to a sovereign legislature, with 
a common lawyer’s conception of the rule of law, according to which the substantive rights of 
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Englishmen were the product of the ordinary decisions of courts applying their remedies to 
concrete cases. In his view, habeas corpus was one of the common law’s primary tools to ensure 
that those in government were always subject to the rule of law. With its roots deep in history, it 
encapsulated what was unique about English liberty, for this common law remedy was a far more 
reliable tool to secure individual freedom than any abstract definition - more significant even 
than ‘the celebrated thirty ninth article of the Magna Carta’.3 The judiciary also acknowledged 
that the writ had a special status. In 1890, in Cox v Hakes, the House of Lords held that there 
could be no appeal against the liberation of a prisoner under a writ of habeas corpus, despite the 
fact that the wording of the Judicature Act of 1873 suggested the contrary. As Lord Halsbury 
explained, the legislation had to be crystal clear before the judges would interpret it as removing 
‘one of the most important safeguards of the liberty of the subject.’4 
 
By 1885, when Dicey’s Law of the Constitution was published, most members of the British 
political nation shared his confidence that the ancient heritage of English liberty was securely 
anchored in modern law. This was an era of social peace and widening political participation in 
England. Habeas corpus had not been suspended since 1818,
5
 nor - until the outbreak of the 
Great War - were there any English political prisoners whom the government wanted to detain 
without charge.
6
 If habeas corpus was a guarantee of people’s liberty against tyranny, it was one 
which never needed actually to be invoked against the government. For those of a Whiggish 
persuasion, the last political cause célèbre in England involving habeas corpus were the cases of 
the prisoners from Upper Canada and Lower Canada, who were detained for deportation after the 
two rebellions in 1837.
7
 These cases had seen the rule of law vindicated by Lord Brougham, 
Joseph Hume, and JA Roebuck, when they thwarted the government’s attempts to remove rebels 
from the provinces without putting them on trial. In Lower Canada, the authorities had issued an 
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ordinance to transport eight men to Bermuda,
8
 while in Upper Canada, legislation was passed to 
empower the executive to grant pardons before trial to those charged with treason, conditional on 
their being transported to a penal colony.
9
 Brougham’s parliamentary attack forced the 
government to concede that the Bermuda ordinance was unlawful and to disallow it. By contrast, 
the Upper Canadian legislation remained in place, and the rebels were removed from the 
province. However, on their arrival in Liverpool, en route to Van Diemen’s Land, Hume and 
Roebuck sought habeas corpus applications on their behalf. Although both the Queen’s Bench 
and Exchequer held that the men were lawfully detained in custody - since they were accused of 
treason - they did not resolve the disputed question whether the crown had any legal power to 
transport them to Van Diemen’s land in the absence of a conviction and sentence. The 
government’s lawyers soon realised they had no such power: faced with the choice of putting 
them on trial for treason in England or letting them go, the government took the second option.
10
 
If the case of the Canadian prisoners seemed to show that the rule of law was a cultural value 
which needed men of political principle (like Brougham or Hume) to vindicate it, it also showed 
that once the law was put into motion, it could constrain even governments to whom the judges 
were favourably disposed. 
 
Englishmen of Dicey’s generation were of course aware that coercion had been used on a 
number of occasions beyond these shores, when the right to habeas corpus had been removed. 
The 1865 rebellion in Jamaica, which had been so brutally suppressed by Governor Eyre after his 
proclamation of martial law, had generated a profound debate in the metropolis about the nature 
of prerogative powers and the rule of law at times of emergency.
11
 Closer to home, Ireland had 
seen habeas corpus suspended on a number of occasions in the reign of Victoria.
12
 Only four 
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years before Dicey’s book was published, a Coercion Act gave the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 
wide powers of detention without trial.
13
 However, thinkers like Dicey did not feel that the rule 
of law was undermined by the occasional need for extraordinary powers, for those who exercised 
such powers could only do so within a framework of laws, ultimately set by a sovereign 
parliament - a parliament which could be trusted to confer them only when the rule of law itself 
was under threat.
14
 The fact that habeas corpus could only be suspended through a proper 
parliamentary procedure was demonstrated vividly in 1881, when Lord Redesdale suggested - at 
a time when Irish Nationalist MPs were blocking the passage of the coercion bill - that an act of 
‘constitutional despotism’ was needed, whereby both Houses of Parliament would simply give a 
first reading to the bill, which could then be acted on by the executive in the certainty that an 
Indemnity Act would be passed in due course. This suggestion was rebuffed by the Lord 
Chancellor, Selborne, who pointed out that it would immediately involve the government ‘in a 
contest with the Courts of Law, and with every Judge of every Superior Court in the country’, 
since they would be duty bound to free any detainee who sought a writ of habeas corpus.
15
 The 
formal principle of the rule of law ensured that no official could interfere with a person’s liberty, 
unless he had clear legal authority to do so, while the substantive values which underpinned the 
ancient English common law were regarded as safe in the hands of the British parliament. 
 
This grand narrative served to sustain a claim that England remained, at its core and in its 
exceptions, faithful to the principle of the rule of law and fundamental liberties dating back since 
time immemorial. However, if it was a persuasive narrative for those in the metropolis of the 
British empire, it may have looked less convincing at the peripheries. While legislation 
infringing liberty was a rarity in fin-de-siècle England, it was much more routine in the wider 
empire on which the sun never set. The same era that saw coercion measures in Ireland also saw 
numerous ordinances issued in West Africa for the detention and deportation of specific political 
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prisoners.
16
 Such legislation became extremely common throughout the empire,
17
 for a standard 
response of imperial administrators faced with troublesome local political activists was to 
remove them to another location where they would cause less trouble.
18
 This raised questions 
about the nature of the rule of law: was it simply a formal principle, to check whether officials 
had acted under powers whose validity could be traced to an authoritative source, or did it 
embody substantive principles inherent in the common law, about what kind of powers could be 
conferred on officials? 
 
Such questions were only rarely discussed by judges in the metropolis, for although the Queen’s 
Bench had jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to ‘all parts of the Queen’s dominions’ at 
common law,
19
 legislation in 1862 had provided that no writ of habeas corpus would issue out of 
England to any colony or foreign dominion of the crown which had courts with authority to grant 
the writ.
20
 Although this necessarily limited the number of cases which came to London, there 
were a number of occasions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when habeas 
corpus cases involving what would now be called the rendition of political prisoners were heard 
by metropolitan judges, either when applications were made directly to the Queen’s Bench or 
when cases came before the Privy Council on appeal from the colonies. These cases give a useful 
insight into the understanding and operation of the concept of the rule of law as it was being 
entrenched, via Dicey’s work, in the conception English lawyers and law students had of their 
constitution. They also give insights into the relationship between law and politics. They often 
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pitted the values of liberty and legality against those of security and executive prerogative, 
raising questions of how far legal rules could triumph over political judgment in cases involving 
state security. As shall be seen, depending on the political context, judges could either be 
champions of liberty or defenders of extensive executive powers, and a ‘substantive’ vision of 
the rule of law was sometimes defended more by parliamentarians than by judges. Nor were 
judges always given the full political picture, but were apt on occasion to be misled as to the true 
nature of the political crisis they were dealing with. They might therefore accord the executive 
great powers when even the executive itself knew that as a matter of political fact, they were not 
needed. 
 
In what follows, the focus of attention will not be on the well-known habeas corpus cases that 
arose in wartime (such as Arthur Zadig’s case)21 or under conditions of martial law (such as DF 
Marais’s case).22 Rather, it will be on some less well-known cases that arose in peacetime and 
involved some form of rendition. We will explore how courts in London reacted to habeas 
corpus cases brought on behalf of prisoners who had been arrested in one place and moved to 
another. It is a question of some contemporary concern, given the recent decision of the Supreme 
Court in Rahmatullah v The Secretary of State for Defence,
23
 where the court held that the writ 
could be issued on behalf of a prisoner who had been arrested by British troops in Baghdad and 
then handed over to American forces to be held in Afghanistan. In such cases, courts face two 
distinct questions: first, whether the detention is legal, and second (if it is not), whether the 
defendant has sufficient control of the body of the detainee for the writ of habeas corpus to be 
appropriate. As shall be seen, in the period under review, courts took an increasingly formalistic 
view of legality, which offered little protection to detainees, but at the same time took a much 
less formalistic approach to the question of control. 
 
Legality 
 
There were two approaches that could be taken in determining whether a prisoner’s detention 
was illegal. On the one hand, courts could take a broad, substantive view of what the rule of law 
required, interpreting any particular legislative powers within a broad framework of common law 
rules protecting personal freedom and ancient statutes such as Magna Carta or the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1640.
24
 On the other hand, courts could take a narrow, formalistic approach, 
focusing on whether the particular legal instrument had been validly authorised by the sovereign 
power. 
 
Sprigg v Sigcau (1896) 
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The first significant case to raise these matters was Sprigg v Sigcau, heard by the Privy Council 
in 1896. The case concerned the detention without trial of the paramount chief of the Pondo. 
Lying between the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, Pondoland had been ceded to 
the British Crown in 1894. Although a treaty with the Pondo had existed since 1844, the territory 
had never been annexed, in part because of the rival interests of the Cape Colony and Natal. 
However, after 1890, the area became increasingly unstable, because of a conflict between 
Sigcau and his former prime minister, Umhlangaso. In this context, in exchange for British 
support, Sigcau agreed first to accept a British resident in his territory, and then to a full cession. 
He was to remain nominally paramount chief, and was to receive a stipend, while his territory 
would be administered by the Cape government.  
 
However, it proved harder to settle the tribal conflict after the cession than the Cape government 
had hoped, and Sigcau continued to intervene in local politics in a way which the colonial 
authorities found unhelpful. As part of the settlement brokered by the British, Umhlangaso was 
to be removed from the territory, and Sigcau was to be paid a fine of 200 cattle. However, Sigcau 
turned out not to have much of a ‘disposition to heal old sores.’25 He refused to accept a tender of 
125 cattle and sought to humiliate Umhlangaso’s followers. This was not the only complaint 
against him. Instead of explaining the system of hut registration (for tax purposes) to his people, 
Sigcau complained to them about his treatment, and insulted the white Registering Officers. 
Besides obstructing the work of registration, he also appeared to interfere with the British 
administration of justice. Sigcau clearly did not understand his place in the new dispensation. In 
June 1895, Sir Hercules Robinson, the governor of the Cape, accordingly issued a proclamation 
stating that Sigcau’s presence in East Pondoland was a danger to public safety and good order 
and authorising his arrest and detention. On 18 June, he surrendered himself and was taken to 
Kokstad (in Griqualand East, into which East Pondoland had been merged). Four days later, the 
Governor-in-Council appointed a three-man commission
26
 to investigate Sigcau’s conduct since 
the annexation of his territory. The commissioners reported that his conduct had ‘been in many 
respects obstructive to the satisfactory magisterial administration of Pondoland’ and that things 
would have been much better if his ‘undoubtedly great personal influence over his people [had] 
been unreservedly and loyally used in support of the new method of government.’ At the same 
time, they found that the attitude and conduct of the people as a whole had been praiseworthy, 
and that this was something for which ‘the chief should receive some credit.’27 Although there 
were no accusations of criminal or seditious conduct against Sigcau, he was informed on 13 July 
that he could not return to Pondoland. He was given the choice either to stay ‘closely guarded’ in 
unspecified territories nearby or be removed to the Cape Colony, where he would be allowed 
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greater freedom. In response, Sigcau asked what crime he had committed, whether the proposed 
exile would be for life, and which territories he might be sent to. Having received no reply, on 29 
July he petitioned the Cape Supreme Court for his release.
28
  
 
At the hearing on the following day, counsel for the Cape government argued that the Governor 
had simply used his powers under the Cape’s 1894 Pondoland Annexation Act, which stated that 
the territory ‘shall be subject to such laws, statutes, and ordinances as have already been 
proclaimed by the High Commissioner, and such as, after annexation to the Colony, the 
Governor shall from time to time by proclamation declare to be in force in such Territories.’29 In 
its view, the Cape parliament had effectively delegated legislative powers to the Governor, as far 
as the territories were concerned. Sicgau’s lawyers countered that the Governor had no legal 
power to issue the proclamation under which he was detained. Indeed, they argued that even the 
Cape parliament itself had no power to pass a law to authorise his detention: for the powers of 
colonial governors were limited by their instructions,
30
 and one of the instructions was that the 
Governor should not assent to bills which were repugnant to the law of England or her treaty 
obligations. Since it was clearly repugnant to the law of England to pass a law which allowed for 
the imprisonment of an individual on the order of the governor, the legislation under which he 
had acted was void. 
 
In a judgment which gave an eloquent ‘substantive’ defence of the rule of law, the Cape court 
ordered Sicgau’s discharge. Sir Henry De Villiers CJ was clearly sympathetic to some of the 
broader arguments made for Sicgau, for he had no doubt that a bill which allowed someone to be 
imprisoned without any process of law would be repugnant to the law of England.
31
 However, he 
did not consider how far the Cape parliament’s powers were limited by section 82 of the 
Constitutional Ordinance, in part because he was unsure of whether he had jurisdiction to 
consider the validity of a colonial act passed against the instructions given to a governor, and in 
part because he did not feel it necessary to do so.
32
 In his view, the central question in this case 
was not whether an act of the Cape legislature was valid, but whether the Governor had acted 
within his powers as a subordinate legislator. Stressing the importance of the separation of 
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powers, he noted that the statute had intended to confer on the Governor only legislative powers, 
not judicial ones.
33
 Nor had it given him the power ‘of exercising arbitrary executive functions 
under the guise of legislative functions.’ In the view of the chief justice, the Governor’s 
proclamation could not be regarded as a law: for he explained - with assistance from the juristic 
works of Grotius, Bentham, and Austin - that the ‘term “laws” is wholly inapplicable to decrees 
directed against individuals’. In this case, the proclamation ‘professes to proclaim a law but in 
reality it issues a decree which is partly executive and partly judicial but wholly arbitrary.’ De 
Villiers spelled out the consequences of a finding for the crown: 
 
If it was legal to sentence Sigcau to perpetual exile for his alleged ‘obstructive’ conduct, 
it would have been equally legal to sentence him to death, and the sentence could have 
been carried out before the meeting of Parliament. He is a native, but he claims to be and 
is a British subject, and there are many Englishmen and others resident in the territories 
who are not natives and who, if the Respondent’s contention be correct, would be liable 
to be deprived of their lives and property as well as their liberty otherwise than by the law 
of the land.
34
 
 
De Villiers was also sceptical about the crown’s claims that there would be disorder in 
Pondoland if Sigcau were released, reiterating a comment he had made in an earlier case that a 
court’s ‘first and most sacred duty is to administer justice to those who seek it and not to 
preserve the peace of the country.’35 In any event, he added that ‘[i]t must tend to enlist the 
natives on the side of the laws if they know that the Courts of law are as ready and willing to 
protect their legal rights as they are to punish them for offences against the law.’36 
        
The Cape authorities appealed to the Privy Council, and the case was argued in July 1896, with 
judgment being given the following February. The Judicial Committee rejected the appeal, but 
on a significantly narrower interpretation of the law. Lord Watson, giving the court’s judgment, 
noted that the Governor’s proclamation was cast ‘in terms which are beyond the competency of 
any authority except an irresponsible sovereign, or a supreme and unfettered legislature, or some 
person or body to whom their functions have been lawfully delegated.’37 Significantly, he added 
that if the Governor could have been shown to be in one of these positions, the court ‘would be 
compelled, however unwillingly, to respect his proclamation’. However, the Judicial Committee 
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decision as a ‘landmark for future generations’ and questioning the government’s decision to 
appeal and ‘The Law of Personal Liberty in the Cape’ (1896) 13 Cape LJ 252-55. 
37
 Sprigg v Sigcau [1897] AC 238, 246. 
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held that the Pondoland Annexation Act did not give the governor the power to make any new 
laws, but only allowed him to introduce into the territory general laws which already existed in 
other parts of the colony. The scheme of the legislation was ‘to delay the enactment of many 
salutary laws elsewhere prevailing throughout the Colony until the native inhabitants of the 
newly annexed territories had so far advanced in civilization and in social progress as to make 
the gradual introduction of these laws advisable.’ The Governor had simply acted ultra vires.38 
 
Ex parte Sekgoma (1909) 
 
Thirteen years later, the question of how to interpret legislation conferring general powers on a 
colonial governor came before metropolitan judges once again, in another case involving the 
detention of a southern African chief. The case arose from the detention in 1906 of Sekgoma 
Letsholathebe, the chief of the Tawana, from N’gamiland in the north-west of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate.
39
 As with Sicgau’s case, it was local tribal rivalries which caused all the trouble, for 
Sekgoma’s right to be chief was disputed by the supporters of his nephew Mathiba. Although the 
British had initially supported Sekgoma’s claims, after the turn of the century, they began to 
regard him as untrustworthy, and to favour his rival.
40
 Matters came to a head in December 1905, 
at a point when Sekgoma had gone to Kimberley for medical treatment. In his absence, some 
members of his tribe sent for his nephew to come from Cape Town and assume the chieftainship. 
Hearing of this, Sekgoma set off to return to the tribe’s capital, Tsau. Anticipating conflict, the 
High Commissioner, Lord Selborne, decided that they should both be kept away from their tribal 
homeland (the Batawana Reserve), pending an investigation into their claims. Sekgoma was met 
at Mafeking (in the Cape Colony) by two Bechuanaland policemen, and escorted to the 
Protectorate.
41
 On 20 April 1906, a warrant was issued in Serowe (in the Protectorate) to detain 
                                                 
38
 Sprigg v Sigcau (n 37) 247. The Cape Law Journal observed that (unlike the Cape Supreme 
Court, whose judgment it admired) the Privy Council had ‘found it unnecessary to express any 
opinion on any of the constitutional questions raised in argument’; and rather chosen to place 
such a narrow construction on the Annexation Act which would ‘necessitate immediate 
legislation to remedy, if chaos is not to prevail in Pondoland’: (1897) 14 Cape LJ 85-93. 
39
 On the Tawana, see A Sillery, The Bechanaland Protectorate (OUP 1952), ch 14. The 
protectorate was proclaimed in January 1885, though in September, the area of Bechuanaland 
south of the Molopo River was proclaimed to be part of British territory (British Bechuanaland), 
while the area to the north was to remain as the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 
40
 See JM Chirenje, ‘Chief Sekgoma Letholathibe II: Rebel or 20th Century Tswana 
Nationalist?’ (1971) 3 Botswana Notes and Records 64-69, whose interpretation is debated 
further in A Sillery, ‘Comments on Two Articles’ (1976) 8 Botswana Notes and Records 292-95 
and Chirenje, ‘Military and Political Aspects of Map-making in Ngamiland : A Rejoinder to 
Anthony Sillery's Comment ’ (1977) 9 Botswana Notes and Records 157-59. See also AJGM 
Sanders, ‘Sekgoma Letsholathebe’s detention and the betrayal of a Protectorate’ (1990) 23 
Comparative and Int LJ South Africa 348-60. 
41
 According to Selborne, he asked Chief Khama to hold both men in Serowe pending his arrival, 
whereupon he had discussions with them and issued the warrant (TNA T1 -11299, Letter from 
Selborne to C Riley, 22 March 1909; see also Selborne’s speech to the African chiefs, reported in 
Mafeking Mail, 26 March 1910). According to Sekgoma’s supporter Charles Riley, he was 
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them both. Two months later, an inquiry held by Ralph Williams, the Resident Commissioner, in 
Tsau determined that Mathiba was the rightful chief.
42
  
 
There were some doubts from the beginning about the legal basis for his detention.
43
 He appears 
to have been detained initially under the Expulsion of Filibusters Proclamation 30 June 1891, 
which had been aimed at removing disruptive Transvaal Boers from the Protectorate. Given 
doubts about the suitability of this provision, a replacement proclamation was issued by Selborne 
on 14 September 1906, which gave power to detain and remove from the Protectorate anyone 
reasonably suspected of being a danger to peace, order, and good government.
44
 This gave the 
authorities three months in which to detain him within the Protectorate. In the meantime, on 20 
November, he applied to the High Court of Griqualand
45
 (which sat in Kimberley) to obtain his 
release. However, Lange J refused to hear the case, since he held that Sekgoma had neither been 
arrested nor detained in a place within the court’s jurisdiction.46 With time running out for 
Sekgoma to be detained under the 14 September proclamation, on 5 December Selborne issued a 
second proclamation, which authorised his continued detention and declared that no writ calling 
in question the legality of his arrest, detention, or deportation should have any effect within the 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘kidnapped in Mafeking’ (in the Cape Colony) by the Bechuanaland Police in April 1906 on his 
way home: ‘Proceedings, orders of the court and affidavits in connexion with an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus for the return of Chief Sekgome Letsholathebe’, TNA CO 879/103/3, 247. 
The High Court of Griqualand, in which Sekgoma first sought a writ of habeas corpus, accepted 
his affidavit that he had been induced by the policemen to go with them to the Protectorate, but 
held that Sekgoma had not claimed to have been ‘arrested’ there. Sekgoma claimed in his 
affidavit that he had never been shown any warrant: Sekgome Letsholathebe v Panzera (22 
November 1906) in Reports of Cases decided in the High Court of Griquland vol 10 (ed SB 
Kitchin, Juta 1911) 90, 92 [10 Griqualand High Court Reports 90]. 
42
 For his account, see Sir Ralph Williams, How I became a governor (John Murray 1913), ch 
22. Sekgoma continued to claim that he was the rightful chief, and that all the difficulties had 
been caused by the intrigues of Chief Khama, Mathiba’s cousin. 
43
 When Sekgoma’s advisers later asked for information about this detention, the Acting 
Resident Commissioner (Barry May) told Selborne, ‘So far as I am aware there is no written 
information upon which the original warrant for the detention of Sekgoma at Gaberones was 
issued.’ 16 March 1909: TNA T 1/11299. 
44
 Note dated 6 September 1906 from EL Mathews (Legal Adviser): TNA DO 119/778. Mathews 
wrote, ‘I can think of nothing better to safeguard persons against arbitrary arrest and removal 
than that they should be brought before a Court of Law. This will not apply to Sekgoma’s case as 
he will be deemed to have been imprisoned by Court of Law’. 
45
 This was Griqualand West, the territory which lay in the northern part of the Cape Colony. 
46
 On the first point, Lange noted that Sekgoma’s affidavit ‘does not allege that he was arrested 
in Mafeking, but goes on to say that he was detained at Palapye [in the Protectorate], and thence 
taken to Gaberones’; on the second, he held that there was nothing to show that the resident 
commissioner was within the jurisdiction of the court (even though his headquarters were in 
Mafeking, and the notice of motion had been served on him in Kimberley): Sekgome 
Letsolathebe v Panzera (n 41) 95. 
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protectorate.
47
 The British were keen to keep Sekgoma away from N’gamiland to prevent his 
reopening the dispute with Mathiba, which it was feared would end in bloodshed. Williams was 
particularly concerned for the fate of the fifteen white traders in the area, whose lives ‘would 
most certainly be sacrificed.’ The colonial authorities also thought that, with Sekgoma off the 
scene, the factions within the tribe would be reconciled. 
 
For the next three years, Sekgoma remained confined in a yard surrounded by barbed wire in 
Gaberone. During this period, steps were taken by the government to obtain a solution under 
which he would be resettled with his cattle away from N’gamiland.48 Sekgoma’s interests were 
represented by Charles Riley, who suggested in 1908 that he be allowed to settle near Mafeking. 
This proposal was rejected by the government, which instead offered to settle him in the Eastern 
Transvaal, which was far enough away to make the authorities confident that he would not 
attempt a return. Although initially inclined to agree, Sekgoma changed his mind in March 
1909,
49
 after Riley proposed going to London to put the ‘case before the British public, and to 
get their support and sympathy.’50 While both sides prepared for a battle in the British press and 
courts, negotiations continued over possible locations for Sekgoma’s resettlement.51 Moreover, 
there were growing doubts among colonial officials about the policy behind the detention.
52
 It 
was in this context that Riley went (with the editor of a Mafeking newspaper and Sekgoma’s 
African secretary) to London, first to present his arguments (without success) at the Colonial 
Office, and then in court.
53
 
                                                 
47
 For background, see TNA DO 119/778. The text of the proclamation is given in The King v 
The Earl of Crewe, ex parte Sekgome [1910] 2 KB 576, 577-79. In the legal proceedings, his 
name was consistently misspelled as Sekgome. 
48
 In 1908, hearings were conducted at Tsau under Proclamation 20 of 1908 to sort out rival 
claims to cattle. Letter from Barry May to Selborne 2 February 1909 in TNA T 1/11299. See also 
Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) 13 August 1908 (‘Ngamiland Natives: No cause for alarm’). 
49
 ‘I will not go because I have committed no crime - I wish to have my case tried before the 
courts in England or else be killed.’ Minutes of interview with Barry May, TNA T1/11299; 
quoted in Chirenje, ‘Chief Sekgoma’ (n 40) 67. See also Mafeking Mail (Mafeking) 14 
December 1909 (‘Sekgoma’s Detention: Mr Peregrino’s Interview. Will not settle in the 
Transvaal’); cf the appeal by his brother, in Rhodesia Herald (Salisbury) 2 October 1908, 11. 
50
 Letter from Riley to Selborne, 5 March 1909, TNA T 1/11299.  
51
 The colonial authorities first investigated whether he could be resettled near Mafeking, and 
then offered him resettlement on the north bank of the Molopo River. 
52
 In March the Acting Resident Commissioner, Barry May, observed that the policy of removing 
Sekgoma from the chieftainship had not secured tranquillity in the tribe, which remained as 
divided as ever, while also expressing doubts about whether the anticipated bloodshed would 
materialise on his return. He stated that Bechuana tribes habitually split: had the dispute between 
these leaders occurred before British rule, ‘there would probably have been some fighting of the 
half-hearted Bechuana kind’ followed by the secession of one of the groups to form a new tribe, 
which would then live in peace with its neighbour. His view was that this was the natural result, 
which the current policy was blocking: Letter from May to Selborne, TNA T1/11299, 9 March 
1909. 
53
 He initially intended to bring an action of false imprisonment against Selborne, but having 
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The application for a habeas corpus was filed in October 1909. It was directed to the Colonial 
Secretary, Lord Crewe. In the view of Sekgoma’s lawyers, Sicgau’s case had established that a 
proclamation such as Selborne’s was ‘absolutely illegal’.54 However, as Lord Chief Justice 
Alverstone pointed out in granting the rule nisi, before the substantive matter of the power of the 
crown to detain by proclamation could be addressed, there were some objections to be met 
concerning the availability of the remedy. The first question was whether the English court was 
the proper court to issue this writ, and the second was whether the Colonial Secretary was the 
right defendant. The King’s Bench Division found against the applicant on both scores. On the 
first issue, it held that he had gone to the wrong court. Instead of seeking a remedy either in the 
High Court of Griqualand or the King’s Bench Division, he should have gone first to the courts 
in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which (these judges felt) did have a jurisdiction to grant 
habeas corpus. They admitted that any judge in those courts would refuse the application, since 
the proclamation ousted their jurisdiction, but they held that Sekgoma could then take his appeal 
to the Privy Council, which could consider the validity of the proclamation. On the second issue, 
they held that the Colonial Secretary had neither custody of Sekgoma, nor control of his gaoler. 
Since his only power was to advise the crown, he was not the suitable recipient of the writ.
55
 This 
was, in fact, a rather artificial view to take: not only had Lord Crewe monitored all the 
negotiations with Sekgoma’s representatives, but he was the man who took the final decisions. 
Indeed, when preparing for the case in September, the Colonial Office itself took the view that 
Crewe was the appropriate defendant.
56
 The judges in this court thereby avoided answering the 
principal question, though it was clear that they were uncomfortable with the ambit of the powers 
being claimed.
57
 In the Court of Appeal, the judges were less concerned with these remedial 
matters. They took the view that no courts existed in the Protectorate with power to issue the writ 
of habeas corpus. This meant that the 1862 Act did not apply, and the London court could hear 
the case. While they were less certain over whether the writ had properly been directed to Lord 
Crewe,
58
 they did feel it could be issued to an officer of the crown in London.
59
  
                                                                                                                                                             
failed to serve the writ on the departing High Commissioner, sought a writ of habeas corpus, on 
Sir Edward Carson’s advice. 
54
 This was Montague Lush’s view, as expressed in the Court of Appeal. He went on (alluding to 
Sprigg v Sigcau), ‘Lord Watson said it would be right if we had a despot who could issue edicts, 
but that such a proclamation was unknown to the English law’: Proceedings (n 41) 72. 
55
 These judgments are in Proceedings (n 41) 63-69. Lush’s argument was that Crewe could give 
directions under the Order in Council to Lord Selborne ‘and until it is clear that no gaoler or 
anybody else would obey Lord Crewe, it is impossible to say that no return should be made’: 
Proceedings (n 41) 55. 
56
 According to an official, Crewe ‘would not consider that he could defend an action on the 
ground that he was not personally responsible for the acts of Lord Selborne. Even if it were not 
done by his orders at the time, the detention is clearly being continued with his authority’: Note 
from AHD 14 September 1909, TNA T 1 /11299. 
57
 See eg Darling J’s comment in Proceedings (n 41) 69. 
58
 The judges endeavoured without success to persuade the crown to accept the inclusion of the 
actual gaoler in the writ, since this was a question of liberty: Proceedings (n 41) 121. 
59
 Farwell LJ thought that where a man was ‘under the control of an officer of the Crown who 
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The main focus of the higher court’s attention was on the substantive question of the validity of 
the proclamation. At issue were the powers of the High Commissioner. Since Bechuanaland had 
not been conquered, ceded, or settled, any power the crown exercised there derived from the 
1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act,
60
 which enacted that the crown’s jurisdiction in such territories 
was of the same kind as it had in conquered lands. Orders in Council
61
 relating to such territories 
had the same effect as if they were part of the Act itself, and were not to be held ‘void on the 
ground of repugnancy to the law of England’. Under an Order in Council issued on 9 May 1891, 
all the Queen’s powers and jurisdiction regarding Bechuanaland had been conferred on the High 
Commissioner, who was empowered to do all things ‘within the limits of this Order as are 
lawful’.62 It also empowered him by Proclamation to provide for the administration of justice, the 
raising of revenue, and ‘for the peace order and good government of all persons’ in the 
Protectorate. The question for the court was whether the High Commissioner had the power to 
issue a Proclamation ordering the detention without trial of a named individual for an unspecified 
time. 
 
Sekgoma’s lawyers argued that he did not. Firstly, they said, even in conquered territories, the 
king’s prerogative powers were limited by fundamental constitutional principles, which included 
the right to habeas corpus. In support of this argument, Montague Lush cited Lord Mansfield’s 
dictum in Campbell v Hall, that ‘a country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of 
the King in the right of his Crown’ and hence subject to parliament. While the king alone had the 
power to introduce new laws in such places, ‘this legislation being subordinate [...] to his own 
authority in Parliament, he cannot make any new change contrary to fundamental principles’,63 
which included the right to habeas corpus.
64
 Secondly, these limitations on the king’s powers 
were confirmed by section 12 of the 1890 Foreign Jurisdiction Act, which stated that no 
regulation could be made ‘in any respect repugnant to the provisions of an Act of Parliament 
extending to the subjects of the Crown in that country’. In Lush’s view, this meant that the crown 
                                                                                                                                                             
acts under the orders of the Colonial Office’, the Colonial Secretary was the proper officer; while 
the others felt that a writ might properly be issued to Lord Selborne in his capacity as Lord 
Chancellor: Ex parte Sekgome (n 47) 592-93, 606, 618, 629.  
60
 53 & 54 Vic c 39. This act consolidated a number of statutes dealing with foreign jurisdiction, 
dating from 1843. 
61
 The 1890 Act did not itself make express provision for the issuing of Orders in Council, but as 
WE Hall noted, the first section by implication enabled the Queen in Council ‘to make such 
Orders as may be necessary from time to time for the purpose of giving due effect to the 
jurisdiction’: A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown (Clarendon 
Press 1894) 10. 
62
 Affidavit of Lord Crewe, which is in Proceedings (n 41) 248-49. 
63
 Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowper 204, 208-09. Cf Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the 
Prerogatives of the Crown (Joseph Butterworth & Son 1820) 29. 
64
 Lush argued further that since the High Commissioner had set up a system of laws and 
procedures in Bechuanaland under earlier proclamations, he had set up a constitutional system 
from which he could not derogate by issuing a proclamation relating to one man alone: 
Proceedings (n 41) 92. 
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was bound to observe the provisions of English legislation, such as Magna Carta and the 1640 
Habeas Corpus Act, which declared that anyone imprisoned by the order of the crown might use 
habeas corpus. Lush also focused on the words in the Order in Council that gave the High 
Commissioner power to do such things ‘as are lawful’. In his view, these words meant that the 
High Commissioner was only given the power of a sovereign bound by the British constitution, 
and not the powers of a despot.
65
 Moreover, having (by a Proclamation of 10 June 1891) set up a 
system of commissioners and magistrates to deal with criminal matters, it was not open to the 
crown to issue another proclamation detaining a single individual, under its powers to issue 
proclamations for the peace, order, and good government of the territories.  
 
Against this, it was argued was that the crown had absolute powers of legislation in conquered 
lands. In such places, Sir William Robson AG argued, there could be ‘no question of 
constitutional limitations such as we have in England or in a self-governing colony, where the 
King has parted with his prerogative’.66 It was also argued that Mansfield’s notion that the 
common law of the motherland set limits to what could be done in colonial legislation had been 
superseded by later legislation, including section 12 of the 1890 Act itself, and the 1865 Colonial 
Laws Validity Act on which it was based.
67
 In addition to this argument, the crown contended 
that Sekgoma’s detention was an act of state which was not to be questioned in a court. Habeas 
corpus was not, in the crown’s view, a writ which could be used by a foreigner held outside the 
crown’s territorial dominions. His lawyers countered that Sekgoma could not be regarded as a 
foreigner, since in Bechuanaland ‘every single legislative and judicial and domestic power has 
been taken from the native sovereign and absorbed by the Crown’.68 
 
Sekgoma lost his appeal. The judges agreed that the power of the crown to legislate in 
Bechuanaland was not limited by any fundamental law. The question of whether the powers of 
colonial legislatures were limited by such principles had already been discussed in cases on the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865, in which it had been held that laws passed by local 
legislatures were not to be regarded as invalid for being repugnant to English law, unless the 
English legislation was directly applicable to the colony.
69
 Moreover, the analogous provision in 
                                                 
65
 Proceedings (n 41) 91-92. 
66
 ibid 42. 
67
 ibid 159. 
68
 ibid 30. There was much discussion at the hearings over whether the foreign Jurisdiction Act 
only gave the crown extra-territorial jurisdiction over British subjects (as Hall thought, in A 
Treatise on the Foreign Powers (n 60) 221-22) or whether it also applied to ‘natives of such 
foreign countries’. The court took the latter view: Ex p Sekgoma (n 47) 596. 
69
 In Phillips v Eyre (1869) LR 4 QB 225, (1870) LR 6 QB 1, where the court had to consider the 
validity of an indemnity act passed by the Jamaica assembly to protect Governor Eyre, Willes J 
rejected arguments that a legislature created by the crown only had powers limited by the 
Mansfield’s ‘fundamental law’. He ruled that ‘a confirmed act of the local legislature lawfully 
constituted, whether in a settled or conquered colony, has, as to matters within its competence 
and the limits of its jurisdiction, the operation and force of sovereign legislation, though subject 
to be controlled by the imperial parliament’: LR 6 QB 1, 20. Cf Riel v The Queen (1885) 10 App 
Cas 675, 678-79. 
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section 12 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act had already been considered by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council in 1899, in The Queen v Staples. In this case, a settler who had been 
convicted of theft in a Matabeleland court made up of a judge and two assessors - but no jury - 
claimed that his rights under Magna Carta had been violated. The Privy Council rejected his 
claim, Lord Halsbury pointing out that the Foreign Jurisdiction Act gave the crown ‘absolute 
power to say what law should be applied, as if it was by absolute conquest’.70 In the court’s 
view, ‘[i]t would be a most unreasonable limit on the Crown’s power of introducing laws fitting 
to the circumstances of its subjects in a foreign country if it were made impossible to modify any 
Act of Parliament which prior to the Order in Council might be invoked as applicable to a British 
subject.’71 
 
For Vaughan Williams LJ, the consequence of this interpretation of section 12 was that the 
crown retained its inherent unlimited power of legislating in conquered lands.
72
 By contrast, 
Farwell LJ inclined to the view that the crown itself might be limited by a fundamental law, but 
that parliament was not: and that the powers exercised by the crown here derived solely from the 
1890 statute.
73
 That statute stated that Orders in Council issued under it were to have the same 
effect as if they were in the act, while the 1891 Bechuanaland Order in Council stated that 
proclamations were to have the same effect as if they were contained in the order: consequently, 
the proclamation had the effect of legislation.
74
 The judges also addressed the question whether a 
proclamation drawn up for one man - in effect a privilegium - fell within the High 
Commissioner’s powers to legislate for the ‘peace, order and good government’ of the territory. 
Although Vaughan Williams was concerned by the fact that the December proclamation under 
which Sekgoma alone was detained ignored the earlier September proclamation which set out a 
procedure for dealing with those to be kept out of Bechuanaland, he was not prepared to say that 
this rendered the later ad hominem proclamation void.
75
 Finally, two of the judges - Kennedy and 
Vaughan Williams LJJ - also seemed inclined to accept the argument that the detention of 
Sekgoma had been an act of state, for which a writ of habeas corpus could not be brought. 
Vaughan Williams LJ accepted that Bechuanaland had never become a territory of the crown, 
and that Sekgoma, who had been described as a British subject in the crown’s documents, was 
not a subject in the same sense as ‘an Englishman resorting temporarily to the Protectorate’. In 
                                                 
70
 This was subject to the qualification in s 12 that ‘if Parliament in respect of that same country 
has passed an enactment on the subject, Her Majesty is not given power to alter that’: The Queen 
v Staples, Report of Proceedings before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 27 January 
1899: Memorandum of Reasons for the decision of the committee, TNA CO 879/103/2, p 12. 
71
 The Queen v Staples (1899) TNA CO 879/103/2, p 3; quoted by Farwell LJ, Ex p Sekgome (n 
47) 615. 
72
 In his view, the ‘fundamental law’ limitation invoked by Mansfield did not apply in this case, 
as the crown had reserved the right to disallow any proclamation, and so had never yet created a 
permanent system of laws in the protectorate: Ex parte Sekgome (n 47) 599. Kennedy LJ thought 
that the crown had power to legislate in Bechuanaland independently of the 1890 Act: ibid 626. 
73
 Ex parte Sekgome (n 47) 612. 
74
 Kennedy LJ held that the 1890 Act was intended to delegate very extensive discretionary 
powers: Ex parte Sekgome (n 47) 627. 
75
 Ex parte Sekgome (n 47) 604; cf similarly Kennedy LJ’s views at 628. 
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his view, although the Englishman might be able to obtain a writ of habeas corpus, the African 
could not.
76
     
   
Sekgoma’s attempt to appeal to the fundamental principles of the common law foundered on the 
rock of parliamentary sovereignty, which was taken to have removed these ancient rights. The 
highly formalistic approach taken by the judges when considering the nature of the High 
Commissioner’s powers rested on a policy developed in the mid-century regarding 
self-governing colonies. By that era, it had become apparent that self-governing colonies could 
not be constrained to pass no laws repugnant to England’s.77 Policymakers in London were also 
aware that colonial legislatures should have the power to suspend habeas corpus in times of 
need: in such cases, the constitutional guarantee against executive abuse would lie in the 
representative assembly. But when it came to the exercise of delegated powers of legislation in a 
colony or protectorate without a legislative assembly, it was less apparent that the governors 
should be held to have unfettered legislative powers, at least in the absence of more specific 
wording indicating that the legislature had intended to confer powers to interfere with liberty. 
Nor was it entirely clear that the case law from the self-governing colonies had definitively 
settled the question of whether or not Magna Carta and the Habeas Corpus Act ‘extended’ to the 
colonies by ‘necessary intendment’. 78 In many ways, the key precedent for the Court of Appeal 
in Sekgoma’s case was consequently the unreported case of Staples, where the Privy Council 
held that the crown was not bound by Magna Carta in issuing Orders in Council under the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act. Farwell LJ certainly seemed to think that this case had clarified the 
meaning of ‘necessary intendment’: ‘You see that Magna Charta is almost as much one of our 
great Charters of liberty as habeas corpus if not more,’ he observed during argument, ‘and they 
have held that because there were no words to answer the phraseology of the Act extending to 
Her Majesty’s subjects in that country but only perfectly general words the Magna Charta did not 
apply’. However, (as Lush retorted) that case did not involve the kind of violation of natural 
                                                 
76
 ‘It may be that an Englishman resorting to the Bechuanaland Protectorate carries the habeas 
with him, but Sekgome certainly does not’: Ex parte Sekgome (n 47) 607. Kennedy LJ observed 
that if Gaberones were ‘within the foreign dominions of the Crown’, the court would have 
jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to Sekgoma, even if he were not a British subject, but held 
that Bechuanaland was not one of the crown’s dominions, and that the order to detain him was an 
act of state.  
77
 The Colonial Laws Validity Act was passed in response to the efforts of a South Australian 
judge, Benjamin Boothby, to challenge the legitimacy of local legislation on the grounds of 
inconsistency with English law: see WR Cornish and others, The Oxford History of the Laws of 
England vol 10 (OUP 2010) 242 and B Kercher, An Unruly Child: A History of Law in Australia 
(Allen & Unwin 1995) 97-102. 
78
 The principal cases were Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 and Riel v The Queen (1885) 10 
App Cas 675. In the former case, Willes J addressed the argument that a colonial statute might be 
void for being contrary to ‘some principle of natural justice’, but held that the (ex post facto) 
Jamaica indemnity statute could not be regarded as ‘naturally or unnecessarily unjust’ (LR 6 QB 
20, 27). These comments were taken by Farwell LJ to have ‘disposed of’ the arguments of 
natural justice, which Lush sought to advance in Sekgoma’s case: Proceedings (n 41) 218, Ex 
parte Sekgome (n 47) 614. 
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justice found in Sekgoma’s case, nor had the key constitutional points been fully argued.79 
 
The judges’ very formalistic interpretation of the law in Sekgoma’s case - one which contrasts 
with the approach taken in Cox v Hakes - is perhaps to be explained by their confidence in the 
probity of the colonial officials, and in their racially-informed understanding of the colonial 
context, which made them think such draconian measures were necessary. While the judges 
showed themselves to be uncomfortable with the idea that these powers might be used against 
white men, there was a continuing presumption that the same rules might not apply to people of 
colour.
80
 ‘The idea that there may be an established system of law to which a man owes 
obedience, and that at any moment he may be deprived of the protection of that law, is an idea 
not easily accepted by English lawyers,’ Vaughan Williams LJ concluded, ‘It is made less 
difficult if one remembers that the Protectorate is over a country in which a few dominant 
civilized men have to control a great multitude of the semi-barbarous.’81 Lord Justice Farwell 
stated that ‘in countries inhabited by native tribes who largely outnumber the white population’, 
the ‘bulwarks of liberty’ which protected the English people ‘might, if applied there, well prove 
the death warrant of the whites’.82 Lord Justice Kennedy similarly took the view that a wide 
interpretation of the power of the High Commissioner to make regulations for the peace order 
and good government was ‘especially just and necessary where, as is the case here, the trustee 
has to govern a large unsettled territory, peopled by lawless and warlike savages, who outnumber 
the European inhabitants by more than one hundred to one.’83  
 
These preconceptions had no basis in the colonial reality. By 1909, local colonial officials 
themselves conceded that Sekgoma’s detention had done nothing to resolve the underlying tribal 
conflict, which was bound to result in a relatively peaceful secession of one part of the tribe, as 
was the norm in Tswana tribal politics. Nor was there much plausibility in the fear that the lives 
of the 15 white traders in the area were at any kind of risk. Sekgoma’s detention was a matter of 
continuing policy, not urgent necessity. It is also not insignificant that the negotiations about his 
release continued throughout the time that the case was before the courts. In the month before the 
Court of Appeal’s decision, lawyers for both sides in Mafeking proposed a settlement under 
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which he would be released with compensation. Although the settlement was delayed when the 
High Commissioner took exception to the amount of compensation offered to Sekgoma,
84
 the 
government eventually agreed to place him and his followers on land on the north bank of the 
Molopo, and to pay his legal costs. Sekgoma - ‘the black Dreyfus’ - was finally released in 
March 1911.
85
  
 
Ex parte Saad Zaghlul Pasha (1923) 
   
Sekgoma’s case confirmed Lord Watson’s point in Sigcau that parliament could authorise 
detention without trial, even through general delegated legislative powers. In 1923, the Privy 
Council was asked to consider the position where the crown acted only under its prerogative 
power in removing and detaining a political opponent. The detainee in this case was a much 
better known figure than the two southern African chiefs: it was Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the 
Egyptian nationalist leader, and sometime Minister of Justice in Egypt. Born around 1857, 
Zaghlul had been a moderate nationalist politician in the first decade of the century, largely in 
sympathy with British rule, but had adopted a more extremist position after 1913. In the wake of 
the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 promising self-determination for the Arabs 
freed from Ottoman rule, he helped form a political party, the al-Wafd al-Misri, which 
campaigned for complete independence. Zaghlul’s effectiveness as an agitator led to his being 
deported to Malta in March 1919 (with three others), though the unrest this generated forced the 
British authorities to release him. Over the next two years, Zaghlul put himself at the centre of 
the Wafd, as the sole authentic interpreter of the people’s wishes, and derided any other attempts 
to negotiate with the British, who for their part regarded him as an unstable and dangerous 
adversary, and an obstacle to their securing a settlement in Egypt under which they would retain 
considerable powers.
86
 Matters came to a head towards the end of 1921. On 21 December, after 
Zaghlul had announced a mass meeting for the following week, the High Commissioner, Sir 
Edmund Allenby, banned the meeting and prohibited him from participating in politics. When 
Zaghlul refused to comply, he and four others were arrested. Although Allenby claimed that 
these measures were only taken to curb the recent ‘harmful agitation’,87 it was evident that the 
prime reason for his arrest was that Zaghlul was a severe political inconvenience. Once it was 
clear that he would refuse to desist from political activity, the government felt it had no option 
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but to deport him.
88
 His removal provided the British with the opportunity to obtain the 
settlement they wanted, and on 28 February, they announced the termination of the 
Protectorate.
89
 
 
After being held in Suez and Aden, Zaghlul was moved on 1 March 1922 to the Seychelles, and 
detained under an Ordinance passed three weeks earlier.
90
 However, over the summer, concerns 
were raised over the effect of his detention in this location on his fragile health.
91
 Given these 
concerns, a decision was taken to move him to Gibraltar. He would be detained there under a 
Political Prisoners Detention Ordinance,
92
 which was passed two weeks after he sailed from the 
Seychelles on 16 August. The wording of the principal provision of this order - relating to the 
power to detain - was almost identical to the Seychelles Ordinance, but it included a provision 
(section 4) not found in the latter: ‘No writ of Habeas Corpus or other process calling into 
question the legality of or other matter connected with the arrest, deportation or detention of the 
said prisoner or prisoners shall have any force or effect in the Colony.’93 
 
Zaghlul arrived in Gibraltar on 3 September, one day before the publication of the order. Soon 
afterwards, he made an application to the Supreme Court of Gibraltar for a writ of habeas corpus. 
His lawyers argued that section 4 of the Ordinance was ‘unconstitutional’, since the Governor 
did not have any power under the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions which defined his 
commission to deprive any detainee of the right to apply for habeas corpus.
94
 The application 
was dismissed by Daniel T Tudor CJ. Mistaking the facts, he held that Zaghlul had been 
convicted by a court martial in Egypt prior to his deportation, and so had been detained by legal 
process. He also held that the governor had not exceeded his powers. Rejecting the argument that 
the Governor had gone beyond the limits set by the Royal Instructions, Tudor CJ said it was 
impossible to conceive ‘how this enactment could have been framed’, or Zaghlul detained as a 
political prisoner, without instructions conveyed by one of the Principal Secretaries of State. It 
was obvious that Zaghlul’s ‘detention is authorised by an act of state’, which the court could not 
look into.
95
 As this judge well understood, the relevant strings in this case were being pulled in 
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London, not in Gibraltar. 
 
In contrast to Sekgoma’s case, Zaghlul’s incarceration continued to attract a great deal of 
political attention, both in London and Cairo.
96
 It was in the context of continuing public debate 
over his detention that a petition was lodged in the Privy Council for special leave to appeal 
against the decision of the Gibraltarian court. The case was argued twice, in January and March 
1923. At the same time that the case was proceeding, the government held numerous discussions 
with Egyptian nationalists connected with Zaghlul to find a way to release him, while avoiding 
his return to Egypt.
97
 It was a process in which the Governor of Gibraltar - whose Ordinance was 
ostensibly passed for the peace, order, and good governance of his colony - played no part. The 
case raised the question whether the crown could ‘detain as a prisoner in Gibraltar an Egyptian 
subject being a subject of a nation at peace with Your Majesty who was for political reasons 
arrested in, and deported from Egypt without any charge being made against him and without 
trial, by order of Your Majesty’s High Commissioner in Egypt claiming to act under “Martial 
Law”’.98 Zaghlul’s lawyer, WH Upjohn, rejected Tudor CJ’s idea that this was an act of state. 
Significantly, he conceded that the court would have no power to question Zaghlul’s detention in 
Egypt, since the court had no jurisdiction over aliens detained outside the empire.
99
 However, he 
argued that once Zaghlul was on imperial soil, he was a ‘friendly alien’ entitled to the rights and 
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liberties of a subject.
100
 Not much time was devoted to arguing this point, as the judges were 
convinced that the case could not be settled by the ‘act of state’ arguments used by Tudor CJ.101  
 
Upjohn’s second argument was to impugn the Ordinance. Accepting that the Governor had 
implemented a command from London, he drew on Mansfield’s dictum in Campbell v Hall that 
the king himself could not authorise an ordinance which went against fundamental laws. 
However, he soon found the judges less receptive to this argument. When Upjohn argued that it 
was the ‘law in every civilised country of the world that a man is not to be condemned without 
being heard,’ Lord Sumner observed, ‘There are many kinds of civilisation, ours is not the 
best’.102 The judges were not prepared simply to accept Upjohn’s universal principles: they 
wanted more specific information to see how the particular rights Upjohn claimed for Zaghlul 
had become law in Gibraltar. However, neither side was at this stage prepared for an argument in 
the Privy Council over what the law of Gibraltar actually was. Given the lack of information, the 
hearing was adjourned for more research to be done. 
 
The research showed that after Gibraltar had been ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 
1716, a number of charters had been issued setting up courts administering English law.
103
 They 
had been followed by orders in council in 1867 and 1884, which stated that the law of England 
was to apply, except insofar as otherwise provided for by any order in council or local ordinance 
past or future. With this information in hand, Colonial Office lawyers prepared three main points 
to answer any case against them. First, they argued that the writ of habeas corpus was not 
available to Zaghlul. Applying the test of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, they took the view that 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 could not apply to Gibraltar.
104
 As to the common law writ, it 
could only derive its force in Gibraltar from its express importation in the 1884 Order in Council, 
which reserved the power to change any Gibraltarian law (including that relating to habeas 
corpus) by local Ordinance. Second, even if the Governor had gone beyond the Royal 
Instructions in passing this ordinance, he would only be answerable to the Secretary of State and 
not to the courts.
105
 Third, both Sekgoma’s case and the wartime decision in R v Halliday106 
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showed that it might be necessary for the sake of peace, order, and good government to make a 
privilegium ordering detention without trial. The crown’s argument was simple. As a conquered 
territory, in which the crown had reserved the power to alter any of the charters it had granted, 
the crown retained the full power to legislate. The only constitutional limit on the king’s power, 
according to Sir Douglas Hogg AG, was that he could not wholly oust the jurisdiction of 
parliament over a territory. There was no inherent right to a writ of habeas corpus in such 
colonies: it was only available insofar as local legislation provided for it. In response, the 
position of Zaghlul’s lawyers was that the series of charters and orders that had been issued in 
Gibraltar since its conquest meant that the fundamental rights of Englishmen had taken root on 
the rock, including the writ of habeas corpus, and could not simply be revoked by an order in 
council dating from 1884. 
 
When the case returned to court on 9 March, it was not to determine whether Zaghlul should be 
freed, but only whether there was a serious enough constitutional issue raised for leave to appeal 
to be granted, so that the substantive matter would be debated at a full hearing. During the 
discussion, Viscount Haldane appeared inclined to accept Upjohn’s arguments. Citing Coke, 
Mansfield, Dicey, and Anson, he suggested that prerogative powers were bound by the common 
law, and had to be exercised in a way consistent with Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights. He 
also suggested that Ex parte Anderson
107
 showed that the writ of habeas corpus did run 
throughout the empire, and that it could only be removed by an Act of the Imperial Parliament.
108
 
‘I am sorry,’ he said, ‘but I do think a very considerable question arises whether the Prerogative 
of the Crown as regards places altogether outside these Islands without a Constitution can be 
exercised otherwise than in accordance with the law.’109 However, the Attorney General, Sir 
Douglas Hogg, was keen to impress on the judges the importance of not allowing the case to 
proceed to a full argument: ‘having regard to what is going on in Egypt’, he said, ‘it would be ‘a 
very very serious matter from the political standpoint’ for the case to go forward.110 Hogg’s 
arguments convinced the majority of the judges. Lord Atkinson, who was on the panel, had 
already expressed the view (in R v Halliday) that statutes protecting liberty were not to be 
interpreted in a different way from any other statutes - a comment which Hogg did not fail to 
bring to the attention of the judges. Lord Dunedin, who pointed out that Magna Carta did not 
apply in Scotland, perceived that the crown was simply using its legislative powers to do in 
Gibraltar what the imperial parliament had done in England during the war.
111
 Lord Wrenbury 
simply said, ‘I cannot follow why, in fact, if the King is the legislative authority, he could not 
legislate’.112 Nor did Lord Sumner feel that Gibraltarian law was subject to control by any 
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fundamental principles.
113
 
 
Given his views, it was perhaps ironic that it was Haldane who was chosen to pronounce the 
decision that leave would not be granted.
114
 The majority on the judicial committee interpreted 
the crown’s prerogative power to legislate in a highly formalistic way, unrestrained by a wider 
substantive notion of the rule of law. According to their understanding, Dicey’s nuanced 
constitutional system - which brought together the rights derived from the common law tradition 
with a parliament acting as the guardian of that tradition - was irrelevant in the colonial context: 
the crown’s powers in the conquered colonies were separate and distinct from the common law 
system at home. Until such point as parliament directly imposed its will on the conquered 
colonies, the crown had an unlimited power to legislate as it saw fit. This legal fragmentation, 
distinguishing between the crown’s powers in different locations, placed obstacles in the way of 
those who had been moved from one part of the British dominions to another, and who sought to 
vindicate the substantive notion of the rule of law that no one could be imprisoned save by due 
process of law. It meant that ministers in London would be at liberty to move political detainees 
around the empire in time of peace, without needing to account for their actions either in 
parliament or in the courts. 
 
It was all too evident to them that this legal compartmentalisation of the empire did not reflect 
political reality. In Zaghlul’s case, every decision concerning his detention was made between 
London and Cairo: the Governor of Gibraltar did not even decide how many guards were to be 
stationed in front of the house where Zaghlul was detained.
115
 It is therefore ironic that one 
constitutional commentator argued that ‘[t]he security for the prevention of injustice’, in cases 
such as Zaghlul’s, lay in the ‘royal power of disallowance’ exercised by the Colonial Office, for 
he appeared to be unaware of the fact that in this case the Colonial Office was itself calling the 
shots.
116
 For men like Zaghlul, the broader substantive notion of the rule of law had to be 
vindicated by the political process, rather than the legal one. In contrast to Sekgoma’s case, 
Zaghlul’s incarceration continued to attract a great deal of political attention, both in England 
and Egypt. It was of particular interest to Labour MPs, some of whom had themselves been 
detained during the war, who ensured that the government remained under intense political 
pressure over what to do with this high profile detainee. Furthermore, at the same time that Hogg 
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was warning the judges about the very dire consequences of even allowing a public airing of the 
constitutional issues, a much more flexible political game was being played, as plans were laid 
for his release. As in Sekgoma’s case, the judges’ decision was influenced by their understanding 
of the political necessities of Zaghlul’s detention: but this understanding was built on limited and 
misleading information. Less than a month after the hearing, Zaghlul left Gibraltar for France. 
With the lifting of martial law in Egypt, he was told that he could return to his homeland, and he 
did return on 17 September. Four months later, he was Prime Minister of Egypt, and when in 
September 1924, he came to visit his British counterpart, Ramsay MacDonald, in Downing 
Street, a feature in the Illustrated London News could proclaim that ‘Egypt as she is to-day is the 
work of Lord Cromer, the Administrator; Lord Kitchener, the soldier; and Saad Pasha, the 
Nationalist’.117 
 
Ex parte O’Brien (1923)  
 
It was not just Zaghlul’s detention which was making political waves. By 1923, the issue of 
rendition and detention without trial was attracting a great deal of critical attention as a result of 
the government’s use of emergency powers at home to deal with Irish nationalists. During the 
war, courts had upheld the crown’s power to deprive particular individuals of their liberty under 
very general delegated powers given by the Defence of the Realm Act, in cases such as R v 
Halliday. The executive-minded approach found in these cases continued to be applied to 
detainees held in the United Kingdom after the end of the war, when Irish political prisoners 
challenged their detentions and deportations. It could be seen in the failure of Patrick Foy’s 
attempt to secure his release from Wormwood Scrubs prison in London, where he had been sent 
after being arrested in Dublin under DORA Regulation 14B. The court rejected the argument that 
the power to detain him, which rested on a wartime provision allowing jury trials to be 
suspended in case of invasion or special military emergency,
118
 had ended with the signing of a 
peace with Germany four days before his detention. As Lord Reading CJ pointed out, the war 
would not be over for legal purposes until the King in Council had proclaimed it, and ‘[w]hen 
once the Court is satisfied that the proclamation was validly issued and that the war is still 
continuing, it has no power to interfere and to consider whether or not circumstances exist which 
justify the continuance of the proclamation.’119 Similarly, Edward Brady failed in his attempt to 
challenge his detention in England in 1921 under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 
(‘ROIA’), on the ground that that act had no application outside Ireland, and that the English 
Home Secretary consequently had no powers under it to detain and deport him. Both the 
Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal (by a majority) made a narrow (and controversial) 
interpretation of the legislation to find that the Act did apply in England. If the judgments in 
these cases appeared to rest on strict constructions of the powers conferred by legislation, it was 
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clear that the judges’ apparently technical interpretation of the law was deeply influenced by 
their political judgments about the powers needed to deal with Irish nationalists.
120
 
 
However, these cases generated some disquiet about the extensive powers apparently retained by 
the executive to detain people without trial outside of war zones,
121
 and one month after 
Zaghlul’s unsuccessful application to the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal in another Irish 
case signalled a change in approach, towards a more substantive understanding of the rule of 
law. The case was brought on behalf of Art O’Brien, secretary of the Irish Self-Defence League, 
who had long been a prominent Irish Republican in London, and who had become a supporter of 
the anti-treaty faction as Ireland descended into civil war, after the creation of the Irish Free State 
in 1922.
122
 At a time when the Irish government was worried that the Republicans might revive 
their guerrilla campaign with help from their supporters in England, the British agreed to arrest 
over 100 supporters and send them to the Irish Free State. O’Brien was arrested on 11 March, 
1923 - two days after Zaghlul’s case failed in the Privy Council - and removed to Mountjoy 
Prison in Dublin. The arrests and deportations generated an immediate political controversy. 
Having already been vocal in its support of Zaghlul, the Labour opposition raised the issue in 
parliament. The leader of the opposition, Ramsay MacDonald, questioned the use of Regulation 
14B of ROIA, which ‘applied to the disorderly situation in Ireland when it was in rebellion 
against us’, and was not designed to deport English residents to the Free State, none of whose 
officials would be answerable for their actions in the United Kingdom.
123
 
 
The detentions were challenged in Ireland and England. On Friday, 30 March, a habeas corpus 
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application was made to the Irish Master of the Rolls, O’Connor, on behalf of Arthur Fitzgerald 
O’Hara, who wanted the court to make a declaration that ROIA and the regulations issued under 
it were void within Ireland and that the British Home Secretary’s order was illegal. O’Connor 
felt that ROIA could not be enforced in Ireland, given the recent change in the constitution, but 
held that the military were entitled to hold the prisoners under martial law.
124
 An application for 
a habeas corpus was also lodged on behalf of O’Brien in England. The argument over the 
legality of O’Brien’s detention turned on the effect on ROIA of recent legislation pertaining to 
the Irish Free State, and on whether this legislation had removed the power of the British 
authorities to order detentions in Ireland. Two acts passed in 1922
125
 had recognised both the 
Irish Free State’s status as a dominion and the constitution passed by the Dail Eirann. A third 
Act
126
 empowered the crown to make any amendments to UK legislation necessitated by the 
establishment of the Irish Free State. The government clearly felt that the power to detain under 
ROIA had not been dislodged by the constitutional legislation, and to clarify matters further, it 
issued an Order in Council under the latter act on 27 March - after O’Brien’s application had 
been made but before it had been heard - confirming that for the purposes of subsections 1(1) 
and 1(4) of ROIA, the words ‘Ireland’ or ‘the British islands’ included the Irish Free State.127 
 
On 10 April the King’s Bench Division refused to grant the rule for a writ of habeas corpus to 
issue. Lord Hewart CJ rejected the notion that ROIA was impliedly repealed when the conditions 
which gave rise to it ceased to exist, and held that ‘Ireland’ was a sufficient specification of the 
place of internment. He also held that the writ should not have been issued to the Home 
Secretary since he did not have physical control over the body of the detainee.
128
 The case then 
moved to the Court of Appeal where the Attorney General, Hogg, specifically drew attention to 
the recent Order in Council. In his view, the fact that the Free State was no longer governed by 
the British Cabinet might be a factor the Home Secretary should consider when choosing a place 
to intern prisoners, but it did not deprive him of the right. For O’Brien, Patrick Hastings KC 
invoked Magna Carta and the Petition of Right, as well as section 11 of the 1679 Habeas Corpus 
Act which prohibited the removal of detainees outside the kingdom. On this occasion, O’Brien 
was successful: the crown was ordered to produce him and make a return to the writ one week 
later. The three judges gave a number of reasons for holding the order to detain O’Brien in 
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Ireland to be ultra vires. For Bankes LJ, the corollary of the power to detain conferred by 
Regulation 14B was the power to release and to control the conditions in which the detainee was 
kept. In his view, the regulation therefore could not authorise the Home Secretary to transfer a 
detainee out of his power, and that being so, it was irrelevant whether or not the Free State was 
geographically an area in which a person could be detained. For Scrutton LJ, the English Home 
Secretary had never had the power under ROIA to intern in Ireland: only the Chief Secretary or 
Lord Lieutenant could do this, but their powers had ceased in 1922.
129
 For Atkin LJ, Regulation 
14B had been repealed, as far as Ireland was concerned, by the Constitution Act, which enacted a 
constitution which provided that no one was to be detained except in accordance with law. 
 
The reasoning of the judges in this case was not simply technical. As he had done in his dissent 
in Brady, Scrutton LJ made a particularly eloquent defence of the need to protect personal liberty 
from executive action, all the more so when the person whose liberty was being protected was 
not ‘particularly meritorious’.130 O’Brien’s case seemed to reaffirm a commitment to a 
substantive notion of the rule of law, after a period of executive-mindedness. How much of a 
turning point it was in the longer term is perhaps open to debate, for the decades which followed 
would see both executive-minded decisions as well as some more liberal ones.
131
 For present 
purposes, what needs to be emphasised is that the rule of law was not self-executing, with the 
common law able to be a neutral and ever present bastion of liberty. Rather, the interpretation of 
the law which was applied here owed much both to the liberal approach of the particular bench 
of judges who heard the case and to the broader political context which made this kind of 
rendition seem so offensive. For by 1923, it was evident that even those who were sympathetic to 
the government’s position - such as David Lloyd George - found ‘the deportation of British 
subjects to a dominion’ to be beyond the political pale.132  
 
Control 
 
O’Brien’s case takes us neatly to the second issue to be considered in habeas corpus cases, once 
it is clear that the detention is unlawful. For besides the issue of the legality of the order to 
detain, O’Brien’s case also raised a question whether the writ could issue to someone who no 
longer had control of the detainee, having given custody to someone else who might be outside 
the court’s jurisdiction. Since the purpose of the writ was to require the person who had custody 
of the detainee to produce his body in court, it was a sufficient return to the writ for the 
defendant to state that he ‘has not the person in his possession, custody, or power’. Nonetheless, 
courts had long looked closely at whether there was any equivocation in the denial of custody, 
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given the importance for liberty of the writ.
133
 In what follows, we will explore how far the 
courts would go to require a person who had parted with control to produce the body. As shall be 
seen, courts in the era under study were often willing to go very far in order to ensure that the 
defendant, who had attempted to remove the person out of his own control and the control of the 
court, should produce the body. One reason for this was that the cases which defined the law in 
this area did not turn on the custody of political prisoners, but the custody of children, whose 
souls were being battled over by rival religious agencies. However, as would be seen in 
O’Brien’s case, principles developed out of child custody cases could also be applied in political 
ones. 
 
Margaret Aylward’s Imprisonment  
 
This issue first came before the courts both in England and Ireland in the late 1850s, when there 
was a high level of anxiety in both countries about proselytism. The attitude of the English courts 
towards religious bodies who sought to obstruct the recovery of children was stated by Lord 
Campbell in 1859: ‘the writ of habeas corpus was sacred,’ he said, ‘and must not be trifled with, 
and if there were any reason to believe that it was [not] honestly and implicitly obeyed, the court 
would inflict condign punishment upon the party who attempted to evade the law of the country.’ 
In the case before him, R v Roberts, a Catholic priest was ordered to be gaoled on an attachment, 
after he had failed to produce a girl who had returned to his school in defiance of her Protestant 
father, and had stated that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts.
134
 At the same period, the 
issue of sectarian ‘kidnappings’ assumed a much higher profile in Ireland. In the aftermath of the 
Famine, Protestant philanthropists set up schools and orphanages for poor and orphan Catholic 
children with a view to converting them. In response to this, the Catholic community set up its 
own voluntary associations. The competition for souls was intense, and accusations soon 
abounded that children were being ‘kidnapped’, and removed from the control of their parents. 
These disputes soon generated litigation,
135
 and a number of habeas corpus cases came to court, 
to recover the custody of children who had been secretly removed from those who wanted to 
place them in Protestant schools. In these cases, the Irish courts showed as tough-minded an 
approach to the question of control as Lord Campbell had. 
 
This approach can be seen in the litigation over the four children of Eleanor Sherwood. They 
were put on a train in Dublin on 14 March 1860, on their way to a Protestant orphanage near 
Galway. During the journey, they fell into conversation with two men travelling in the same 
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carriage, on their way to the Galway Assizes. On discovering that they were Catholic orphans, 
these men - Thomas James M’Robins, a lawyer who was also Chairman of Roman Catholic 
Dormitory in Townsend Street, Dublin, and his client Denis O’Connor - decided to return the 
children to Dublin. Evading the matron of the orphanage who had come to meet them, they took 
the children to a lodging house in Galway owned by John O’Connor, where M’Robins made 
arrangements for their removal. On the following day, their mother arrived in Galway and went 
to look for them at the lodging house. Having been refused access, she obtained a writ of habeas 
corpus from Justice Hayes, addressed to both O’Connors. In their returns, made on 20 March, 
they stated that they did not have any control over the children, and did not know where they 
were. The returns were adjudged insufficient, and the two men were told that a writ of 
attachment would issue against them in ten days time unless cause was shown. On 22 March, 
M’Robins - who had himself drawn up the returns - took the children back to Dublin, handing 
them over to Catherine Davis (a cousin of the children’s father), and Ellen Blake (their 
grandmother). The children were later taken from these women by a man claimed by their 
mother to have been a Catholic clergyman.
136
 With the children still missing, habeas corpus 
proceedings were taken against all the parties involved, and attachment orders were issued 
against the O’Connors, M’Robins, Davis, and Blake, in order to force them to divulge what they 
knew about the whereabouts of the children. With no information forthcoming, they were all put 
in the custody of the Marshal of the Four Courts Marshalsea. All but M’Robins - the main mover 
in the affair - were released after Ellen Blake’s death in custody in November. He was finally 
discharged in April 1861, by which time it had become apparent that the children were in the 
custody of their paternal family. At this final hearing, the court accepted that M’Robins had now 
no control whatever over the children, and considered his six months’ imprisonment as sufficient 
punishment for his contempt in obstructing the writ of the court. Although all five defendants 
were gaoled for failing to make an adequate return, it is clear that none of them (save perhaps 
John O’Connor) had actual control of the children at the time the writ issued against them. 
However, this was not an issue of concern to the courts, which were convinced that the 
defendants at least had the knowledge to trace the children and secure their return. Indeed, there 
was little doubt in either the Catholic or Protestant Press that the children had not been had been 
taken by a complete stranger and were untraceable.
137
 
 
Another case resulted in the imprisonment of one of the most prominent campaigners, Margaret 
Aylward, the founder of St Bridget’s Orphanage in Dublin.138 The case concerned Mary 
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Matthews, who had been sent to Miss Aylward’s orphanage in April 1858 by Mrs Mary Jordan 
after she had been asked by the girl’s dying father to ensure that she be raised a Catholic. The 
child’s mother was a Protestant, who had left her family to work as a servant in the West Indies, 
but after being dismissed from her job, she returned to Ireland and sought custody of her child. 
On 28 May 1858, she obtained a conditional order for a habeas corpus to be issued against Mrs 
Jordan. Having discovered from Mrs Jordan’s affidavit that she had given the child to Miss 
Aylward, Mrs Matthews went to the orphanage, on both 4 and 5 June, but was refused entry. On 
10 June, she obtained a conditional order for a habeas corpus directed to Miss Aylward, who 
responded in an affidavit six days later that she considered Mrs Jordan to be the legal guardian, 
appointed by the child’s father. She added that she had placed the child with a nurse seven miles 
from Dublin on 3 April, but ‘for obvious reasons’ declined to reveal the name of the nurse unless 
ordered to do so by the court. 
 
Proceedings were delayed, pending the outcome of another case, In re Moore, where a widowed 
Catholic mother attempted to recover custody of the child she had given to a Protestant 
orphanage, and where the mother’s legal rights had been challenged.139 In the meantime, the 
defendants drew up affidavits stating that on 8 June 1858, a strange woman had come to the 
nurse’s house, with a forged letter, purportedly written by Miss Aylward, asking for the child to 
be given to her. The girl apparently knew the woman with the note, and went away quite happily. 
This had only come to Miss Aylward’s attention (the affidavits claimed) on 19 June, when the 
nurse, Elizabeth Kenny, visited her. This was to suggest that the child had disappeared without 
trace, through no fault of Miss Aylward’s.140 When the case returned to court in November 1859, 
emphasis was put on her lack of control and her consequent lack of means to obey any order to 
produce the child. However, Mrs Matthews’ counsel poured scorn on the story of the forged 
note, and pointed out that even though she had apparently made the discovery only three days 
after submitting her affidavit in reply to the conditional order, Miss Aylward had not taken any 
steps either to recover the child in the intervening period, or to alert the authorities about her 
disappearance. Holding that the affidavits were not a sufficient answer, the court made the 
conditional order absolute. Despite her apparent disappearance, Miss Aylward was regarded as 
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still being responsible for the child. ‘[I]t would be a perfect absurdity,’ Chief Justice Lefroy 
ruled, ‘to doubt the legal responsibility of a person who, taking the custody of a child, without 
the consent of the guardian, and thereby rendering herself answerable to the guardian, can divest 
herself of that responsibility, by transferring the child to the custody of another.’141 Whether the 
apparent subsequent abduction of the child would be a sufficient answer would be discussed 
when they saw her return. Hayes J agreed, adding, ‘The writ must go, else this Court might be 
completely baffled in its protection of the liberty of the subject.’142 
 
The case returned to court in April 1860, when Miss Aylward made a return stating that she had 
neither control over the child nor the means of procuring her body. The court divided on 
sectarian lines over whether the return was sufficient. The Catholic O’Brien J held that the return 
was sufficient both in law and in fact. As a matter of law, she did not have to explain how she 
came into custody of the child, and how it left her possession, since she denied having custody at 
any point since the writ issued, nor was there any factual evidence to contradict her affidavit, and 
it was not incumbent on the person making the return to prove the truth of statements contained 
in it. O’Brien also stressed that the object of the writ was ‘not to recover damages, or make that 
party responsible if the child went missing after the defendant had refused to hand it over’, but 
simply to require a person detaining another to produce her.
143
 The two Protestant judges 
disagreed. Hayes J held that the return was insufficient in law. Having admitted the original 
taking of Mary, it was incumbent upon her to show the court what had become of the child once 
in her custody.
144
 In his view, Miss Aylward had made herself responsible for the child when she 
deliberately and wrongfully refused to recognise the mother’s legal rights. Hayes clearly 
suspected that there had been connivance here, but in any case, she could not ‘found a legal 
excuse upon a misfortune which resulted from her own misconduct and neglect’.145 He compared 
her liability with that of defendants in trover, who had transferred the plaintiff’s goods to a third 
party. Lefroy CJ agreed. For him, the central question was not whether she now had control, but 
whether she had had control on 10 June, when the conditional order issued. Although she 
claimed that the child had already been taken by the stranger, looking at the facts of the case, he 
did not believe that the child could have been removed without her collusion. Citing Lord 
Campbell’s dictum in Roberts with approval, he concluded that this was not an ‘honest and 
implicit’ obedience to the writ. 
 
An attachment was issued, but Miss Aylward was allowed to tender bail to answer 
interrogatories.
146
 After the submission of voluminous answers, the case returned to court in 
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June. This time the court was unanimous. The additional evidence revealed since the April 
hearing convinced all members of the court that Miss Aylward and Mrs Jordan had been acting 
together to ‘baffle’ the authorities. Miss Aylward knew that the mother of the child would seek 
to recover her (having been warned of this by Mrs Jordan’s priest), and had consequently 
changed the child’s name to Mary Farrell. She had seen the writ served on Mrs Jordan, and had 
her lawyer draft the answering affidavit, creating a delay during which time the child went 
missing. In these circumstances, the writ issued to Mrs Jordan could be taken to have been 
served on her. O’Brien J still felt some doubt over her liability in a habeas corpus case for the 
subsequent abduction of the child (which he accepted she did not authorise), but he held that her 
conduct in not disclosing the abduction of the child after the writ was served on her was a 
contempt. Her conduct was designed ‘by anticipation to frustrate any order which the Court 
might make for the delivery of the child to the mother.’147 Miss Aylward was not gaoled 
immediately but was given bail,
148
 though the court did impound the case papers, with a view to 
prosecuting her for felony. However, any hope that the child would be produced as a result of 
these threats, as it had been in the Roberts case, proved unfounded. When the case returned to 
court in November, Miss Aylward’s lawyer declared that she had no means of locating the child, 
and had satisfied her conscience that she had done nothing wrong. On this occasion, the court 
ruled that she be gaoled for six months.
149
 Her case continued to remain prominent in the public 
press.
150
 Her supporters set up the St Bridget’s Defence Committee to raise funds for the costs of 
the case, and continued to debate the merits of the case.
151
 She was eventually released, returning 
to her philanthropic activities, and continuing her campaign against what she considered 
Protestant proselytism. Mary Matthews was never returned to her mother (or her Protestant 
supporters) and it later turned out that the child had been sent overseas.
152
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Dr Barnardo’s Attachment 
 
These cases demonstrated that Irish courts would go far to check whether defendants retained 
effective control over a person being sought, and showed that they were prepared to imprison 
people for contempt who were perceived to obstruct the recovery of that person. The question of 
how far English courts would go was resolved in the 1890s when the sectarian war over the souls 
of orphaned children that was being waged between Dr Thomas Barnardo and the Catholic 
Bishop of Salford, Herbert Vaughan, found its way into the House of Lords. Vaughan was 
concerned that the numerous Protestant bodies providing homes for orphaned and destitute 
children were proselytising agencies bent on the conversion of Catholic children, and helped set 
up a Catholic Protection and Rescue Society in 1886 to prevent the children of Catholic parents 
being taken into Protestant institutions.
153
 The Salford-based society began its campaign with an 
(unsuccessful) attempt to prosecute an officer of the Manchester and Salford Boys and Girls 
Refuge for abduction, but found that writs of habeas corpus were more effective tools.
154
 
Barnardo, the publicity-hungry founder of the famous Homes for Orphan and Destitute Children, 
had grown up in Dublin and been inspired by the work of Protestant philanthropists there. He 
was also fiercely anti-Catholic,
155
 and determined to resist any habeas corpus applications 
brought by Catholic litigants demanding the return of their children.
156
  
           
Barnardo was prepared to use all kinds of tactics to prevent children falling back into Catholic 
hands. Mothers were told that they had signed binding agreements, that they had no rights over 
illegitimate children, or that they were simply unfit to look after their child. It was not an 
argument which convinced the courts,
157
 and led to strong criticism of his methods.
158
 An even 
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more controversial tactic was to move children to inaccessible places. In two cases, anticipating a 
writ of habeas corpus from Bishop Vaughan’s lawyers, Barnardo gave children to strangers to 
take them out of the country. The first case concerned Martha Ann Tye, who had been found 
wandering the streets of Bristol. In July 1888, her mother agreed to entrust the child to Dr 
Barnardo’s Homes for two years. However, at the end of the year, and having remarried, she 
sought her daughter’s return, so that she could be given a Catholic education. Sensing Vaughan’s 
involvement, and anticipating legal proceedings, Barnardo acted quickly. On 21 December, the 
day when his solicitors met the mother to discuss the issue, the child was handed over (without 
the mother’s knowledge) to a Mme Gertrude Romand, a French-Canadian who took the child 
first to Europe and then to Canada.
159
 In January 1889, the mother obtained a writ of habeas 
corpus, which gave Barnardo until 30 April to produce the child. In his return to the writ, 
Barnardo stated that Mme Romand had refused to return the child, or to say where she could be 
found.
160
 Justice Mathew did not accept Barnardo’s argument that he had no control over the 
child, and condemned the return as ‘evasive and unsatisfactory’. An attachment was issued, 
although its execution was delayed to allow Barnardo to answer interrogatories ‘to compel him 
to state fully and frankly on oath all that can be known about the child, so that the mother may 
have a chance of getting her back.’161 Barnardo appealed, but the Court of Appeal confirmed that 
the facts stated in his return - that he had parted with the custody of the child and could not get 
her back - were not an excuse for non-compliance with the writ and held (following the line 
taken in Margaret Aylward’s case) that the attachment had to issue.162 The court did not accept 
that the fact that he had disposed of the child before the writ issued excuse him from liability to 
the writ, for the judges took the view that he had acted unlawfully in parting with the custody of 
the child before the writ issued. ‘Persons who illegally put a child out of their power do so at 
their peril,’ Lindley LJ explained, ‘and, if they are ordered to produce the child, no excuse 
founded on their own inability to comply with the order will be held a sufficient answer to the 
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writ.’163    
 
The decision in Martha Tye’s case unleashed a series of applications by parents for the custody 
of their children.
164
 The most prominent involved another child sent to Canada, Henry 
Gossage.
165
 The application was brought by his mother, Mary Ford. Originally from Leamington, 
the boy had (according to Barnardo) been sold by his drunken and dissolute mother to two organ 
grinders, with whom he had tramped around the country for four months. They had abandoned 
him in Folkestone, where he had been found before being handed over to Barnardo on 25 
September 1888. Although the boy’s mother had never signed the standard agreement with 
Barnardo’s homes, she had indicated that she would be pleased if he kept her son. However, on 
10 November, Barnardo received a letter from Alfred Newdigate from Leamington,
166
 written on 
behalf of the (illiterate) mother, who wanted the child to be put into a Catholic home, St 
Vincent’s Home on Harrow Road. On the same day that this letter was written, Barnardo first 
met William Norton, a Protestant Canadian, who told him he had lost his son and wanted another 
to adopt.
167
 On 16 November, he entrusted the boy to this unknown Canadian, having seen only a 
letter of recommendation from an unknown Presbyterian minister, whose name Barnardo could 
not recall.
168
 Furthermore, Norton refused to disclose his address, since he claimed that it was 
common for birth parents to seek to obtain the return of their children in Quebec, something he 
wanted to avoid.  
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Although Newdigate was sent a formal acknowledgment of a donation he had given, no reply 
was sent to his request for the child. Nor was a reply sent to Douglas Hope, of St Vincent’s, who 
had written about arrangements relating to the boy, until the middle of December, when a note 
was sent simply declining to comply with his request. When Newdigate wrote again on 22 
December, a reply was sent stating that Dr Barnardo’s homes were ‘not designed for 
proselytizing purposes’ and that children would not be returned on religious grounds. No 
mention was made that the child had been removed to Canada. Only on 8 January 1889 (in the 
face of threats to bring a writ of habeas corpus) was a letter sent stating that the boy ‘is not and 
has not been for a considerable time an inmate or under the control of the Managers of these 
Institutions.’ When the application for a habeas corpus was made in March, Mathew J refused it, 
this time accepting Dr Barnardo’s statement that the child was out of his custody and control. 
However, on 30 November (after the decision in Tye), the Queen’s Bench Division ordered that 
the writ should issue. As for Barnardo’s claim that he could not produce the child, Lord 
Coleridge said: ‘You must produce him. You had no business to get rid of the child, and 
therefore the law deems the child to be virtually in your custody.’169 Barnardo took his case to 
the Court of Appeal, which confirmed that the writ should issue. Lord Esher also took the 
opportunity to explain the court’s earlier decision in Tye. The court had not, he pointed out, 
decided in that case that habeas corpus could be used ‘merely for the purpose of punishing a past 
illegality’ if it was utterly impossible for a child to be returned (for instance, if it had died). 
However, they took the view that unless ‘such absolute impossibility was clearly shewn,’ it was 
no excuse to say that, as a result of his own illegal action, it had become ‘extremely difficult or 
almost impossible’ to produce the child: in such cases, the court would insist that he ‘do 
everything that mortal man could do in the matter’ until it was clear that the child’s return was 
‘an absolute impossibility’.170  
 
Barnardo again challenged the decision and in July 1892, the appeal finally reached the House of 
Lords.
171
 The Lords rejected the view of the law stated in Tye’s Case, that the writ could be used 
against a person who had unlawfully removed someone from their custody. Lord Watson was 
particularly critical of Lindley LJ’s formulation. The writ, he noted, was intended to facilitate the 
release of persons in unlawful detention, and was not the vehicle to inflict penalties on those who 
had at one time or another illegally detained them. In his view, to order a person who had 
unlawfully parted with the custody of a child to recover it for the court would necessitate the 
employment of ‘agents and detectives, and application for the assistance of foreign Courts, 
which, in my opinion, are neither more or less than penalties imposed in respect of his breach of 
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duty.’172 Lord Herschell agreed that the writ could not be used as a method of punishing a person 
who had parted with the custody. Lord Halsbury also took this view, though he added that the 
court had to look very closely where it suspected that ‘a counterfeited release has taken place, 
and a pretended ignorance of the place of custody or of the identity of the custodian is insisted 
on’.173 This was to confirm Lord Esher’s explanation that the writ could not be used as a 
punishment for a past wrong (as Lindley LJ’s dictum seemed to imply), but it could be used to 
test whether the defendant had any real ability to return the person.  
 
Barnardo v Ford thus settled the point that the writ of habeas corpus could only be used to order 
a person to produce the body of a person under his control at the time the writ issued. It could not 
be used to punish a person who had acted unlawfully before that moment. To impose 
punishment, one needed a criminal trial, with the appropriate criminal penalties. This aspect of 
the decision came in for some criticism from the Law Quarterly Review, which noted that while 
the Court of Appeal’s use of the writ in Tye may have been novel, ‘some of the most admirable 
portions of English law have been created by judges who have known how to employ old forms 
for new purposes’. The journal felt that the Lords had checked an innovation calculated to give 
effect to the spirit of the law, and ‘really to ensure that respect for personal liberty, the securing 
whereof is the end for which the writ of habeas corpus exists.’174 
 
However, the Lords’ decision was not the end of the matter for Dr Barnardo. For while the Lords 
disapproved of the law as stated in Tye, they agreed that the applicant was entitled to the issue of 
the writ, so that the disputed facts about the degree to which Barnardo in fact had control could 
be more fully investigated on the return. The writ was issued and Barnardo made his return in 
November.
175
 The return stated that Henry Gossage had not been in Barnardo’s ‘custody, power, 
or control’ since 16 November 1888, and that Barnardo had had no communication with William 
Norton since that date. He stated that he had ‘by employing skilled detectives’ sought to trace the 
boy, ‘but I have been hitherto unable to discover him or to obtain intelligence or information 
about him.’176 Nor was this the end of the matter, for the applicants traversed the return, and the 
court gave time for further affidavits to be filed to investigate the truth of the matter.
177
 The 
matter itself was not determined until May 1893, when the case came before Baron Pollock and 
Hawkins J. This time, Dr Barnardo was required to supplement the information in his affidavit 
by giving oral evidence in court. In the end, the judges accepted that the return was a true one - 
that Dr Barnardo was as a matter of fact unable to do anything more to return the boy. But they 
were far from happy. Hawkins J was ‘extremely suspicious as to the truth of the return’, and was 
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far from convinced even of the existence of William Norton. However, both judges accepted as 
true that Barnardo had handed the boy over to a person who could not be traced.
178
  
 
As this history shows, in Dr Barnardo’s case, the courts made repeated attempts to test whether 
his assertions that he had no de facto control were true.
179
 Rather than simply accepting the 
words in his return to the writ that he had no control, the court sought to test the truth of the 
return, just as they had in Margaret Aylward’s case, by further examinations of both 
documentary and oral evidence.
180
 
 
Art O’Brien’s Return 
 
Barnardo’s case was much in the minds of the Court of Appeal judges when dealing with 
O’Brien’s rendition. There was an apparent paradox in the case. On the one hand, it was argued 
that the fact that the Home Secretary had deprived himself of control over O’Brien showed that 
the order was ultra vires; on the other hand, he was seeking a writ of habeas corpus, which was 
premised on the assumption that the Home Secretary had control. But in fact, Atkin LJ ruled, 
there was no dilemma: 
 
In testing the validity of the order the question is as to the legal right to control; in testing 
the liability of the respondent to the writ the question is as to de facto control. In all cases 
of alleged unjustifiable detention, such as arise on applications for the writ of habeas 
corpus, the custody or control is, ex hypothesi, unlawful: the question is whether it exists 
in fact.
181
 
 
Indeed, although it had been argued in court that the Home Secretary did not control O’Brien’s 
body, the government had already given assurances in the House of Commons that the Irish had 
agreed that the men could apply in person to the Advisory Committee appointed to monitor their 
detention, and to release them if that committee recommended it. They had also agreed that the 
men would not be charged with any criminal offence without the consent of the British. It was 
evident that there was very close co-operation between the two governments. Although in his 
affidavit to the court, the Home Secretary denied having control over the body of O’Brien, he 
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subsequently told the Commons that this only meant that he had no control over his treatment in 
the Mountjoy Prison, ‘but on all other points I had essential control’.182 There was also 
continuing correspondence between the two governments on how to make arrangements for 
O’Brien’s transportation in case of an adverse verdict. Indeed, on the day of the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment, the Home Secretary sought confirmation from the Irish that they would 
indeed hand him over - ‘in view of possible questions in Parliament’.183  
 
Although Atkin LJ in his judgment had indicated that the court would consider the question of 
whether the Home Secretary had in fact lost control when the return was made (as had been done 
in Barnardo’s case), the government took the words in the writ that the body had to be produced 
along with a return to the writ literally.
184
 As far as the government was concerned, everything 
therefore hinged on the outcome of an appeal to the House of Lords against the decision to issue 
the writ. During the brief five-day interval between the two sets of hearings, it was decided to 
bring O’Brien back to England, so that he could be released if the appeal failed.185 Unlike 
Barnardo and others before him, they did not plan to continue the battle when the time came to 
make a return to the writ by arguing the impossibility of returning him.
186
 Equally, even though 
the Home Office drew up an order under ROIA authorising his detention in Brixton Prison on his 
return, they were not inclined to argue on the return that he was now lawfully in detention, under 
an amended 14B order. Consequently, even though they were disappointed by the Lords’ 
decision that they did not have the jurisdiction to hear the case,
187
 O’Brien was produced in 
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court. The government’s willingness to comply - at the first stage of what might otherwise have 
been a long, drawn-out process - may have reflected an awareness that it was by now a political 
impossibility to argue that they had no control. Not only had the government proclaimed its de 
facto control, but as The Times stated after the Court of Appeal’s decision, ‘it would be startling 
indeed if the Courts were to hold that the Executive might defeat the Statutes, and indeed the 
Common Law, by shipping persons under arrest to a place where the English writ of habeas 
corpus could not run’.188  
 
As a result of the decision, over 100 internees who had been deported to Ireland were released. 
However, prior to O’Brien’s return, plans had already been laid by the two governments for 
further proceedings to be taken against him and half a dozen others.
189
 As soon as O’Brien left 
the court which had secured his release from internment, he was rearrested and taken to Bow 
Street magistrates court on a charge of seditious conspiracy.
190
 By the time the House of Lords 
handed down the reasons for its judgment in the crown’s appeal, O’Brien and Sean McGrath had 
been convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.191 O’Brien’s legal challenges may not 
have secured him his liberty, but, with the aid of political pressure from parliamentarians, they 
did restrain the government’s departures from the rule of law. The Cabinet’s immediate response 
to the Lords’ decision was to pass a single bill both to Indemnify the Home Secretary for his 
actions, and ‘to obtain legislative powers for the arrest and internment in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland of persons engaged in plots against Ireland or other parts of the Empire’. 
However, following strong protests from MPs, the latter proposal was dropped from the bill.
192
 
The government also had some difficulties with its Indemnity Bill, designed to protect the Home 
Secretary not only from an action by O’Brien for false imprisonment, but also for the penalties 
prescribed by section 11 of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 for those who sent prisoners abroad.
193
 
The Labour Party opposed the Indemnity Bill, and criticised the Home Secretary for describing 
as criminal the activities of men whose trial was still in progress. Criticism was also raised that 
an Indemnity Bill would remove the internees’ right to financial compensation, and this 
objection was met by the creation of an Irish Deportees Compensation Tribunal, presided over 
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by Atkin LJ.
194
 O’Brien’s legal actions were stayed, though he did recover compensation from 
the committee. 
 
In O’Brien’s case, Sir Douglas Hogg argued that the writ should not issue against the Home 
Secretary, since he had no control over O’Brien ‘except insofar as it is given by an agreement 
entered into between the British Government and the Free State ... and that agreement is not 
enforceable in any Court of law.’195 As a matter of law, it was right to say that, at that point, WC 
Bridgeman had no legal power over the Irishman, but only an agreement that no English court 
could enforce. However, as in Barnardo, the court was not prepared to treat the question of 
control as one settled by such legal analysis. It was a factual question, which required the court 
to be convinced that it was factually impossible to obtain the return of the prisoner. In other 
words, where the government had disposed of a person in violation of the rule of law, the court 
was prepared to go to extremes - in effect threaten an attachment against the Home Secretary - if 
he did not take all the steps he could to obtain the return of the body. At the same time, it was 
clear that the matter was also deeply political. Without the political pressure from the Labour 
Party and the media, the government might have held out. But equally, without the Court of 
Appeal’s decision, the political pressure would have had no effect. 
 
Epilogue 
 
Art O’Brien’s case signalled a move by the Court of Appeal away from the executive-minded 
approach taken both in the wartime detention cases and in the early twentieth century colonial 
rendition cases we have examined, and the court also took a broad view of the reach of the writ. 
In this case, it secured the return of a prisoner who had been transferred without lawful authority 
to another jurisdiction. The decision did not, of course, spell the end of political detentions. 
Emergency legislation passed at the outbreak of the second world war resulted in the detention of 
nearly 2,000 detentions of British citizens under Regulation 18B, which conferred power on the 
Home Secretary to detain anyone he had ‘reasonable cause to believe’ was ‘of hostile origin or 
associations’. In the context of the war, the highest court reverted to the executive-mindedness it 
had shown in the Great War, holding in Liversidge v Anderson - in the face of Lord Atkin’s 
famous dissent - that it could not examine the reasons for the detention, but had to accept the 
Home Secretary’s assertion that he had reasonable grounds at face value.196 
 
Within the colonial context, very large numbers of political prisoners continued to be detained 
without trial as struggles for independence intensified in the twentieth century. In many colonies 
in the post-war period, states of emergency were declared, authorising detention without trial on 
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the model used in wartime Britain.
197
 The number of political detainees able to challenge their 
detentions remained very small. Only a handful of habeas corpus cases reached courts in 
London, where they met with mixed results. Where regulations had been clearly worded to 
authorise the detention or removal of prisoners, the Privy Council upheld the power to detain, 
and to transfer prisoners from one jurisdiction to another, by tracing the power formally to valid 
legislative instruments. Thus, in Zabrovsky v General Officer commanding Palestine, it was held 
that the writ could not be used to challenge the detention by the British military authorities in 
Eritrea of the applicant’s son, who had been detained by the authorities in Palestine and deported 
to Eritrea.
198
 Distinguishing the decision in O’Brien, the court held that the Palestinian 
authorities had the power to detain and deport Arie Ben Eliezer under its Emergency 
Regulations. Although they had no power to order his detention in another jurisdiction, it was 
pointed out that his detention in Eritrea was by virtue of a proclamation issued by the British 
military authorities in Eritrea, which the Jerusalem court (and the Privy Council from which the 
appeal was brought) could not examine. Although the judges were aware of the importance of 
the writ for the liberty of the subject, they noted how, ‘[i]n the troublous times of war and in the 
chaotic post-war conditions’, the executive had been given extensive power to interfere with 
it.
199
 Similarly, in Al Baker v Alford, the Privy Council upheld the transfer to St Helena of 
political prisoners from Bahrain - a foreign territory in which the crown exercised a jurisdiction 
under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1890 and 1913 - after last minute Orders in Council had 
been issued, to allow an arrangement to be made under the 1869 Colonial Prisoners’ Removal 
Act.
200
 The men were ultimately released, not because any court considered that the colonial 
legislation was inappropriate for this kind of transfer, but because of a formal slip, when it was 
revealed that the warrant for the men’s removal had been issued before the sanctioning Order in 
Council had been published.
201
 
 
Although tightly-drafted regulations often limited the power of judges to challenge the legality of 
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detentions, there were also some cases where a less formalist approach could be taken, and 
detainees were given a remedy using the writ. One such was the case of Eshugbayi Eleko, who 
was removed from Lagos, where he was paramount chief,  by the Governor in 1925.
202
 The 
latter had power, under the Deposed Chiefs Removal Ordinance of 1917, to remove any ‘native 
chief’ who had been removed from office ‘by and with the sanction of the Governor’, either if 
‘native law and custom’ required it or if he considered it necessary for the peace, order, and good 
government. Using this legislation, the colonial authorities issued two orders: one sanctioning his 
deposition - which was said to have been by other members of the ruling house - and another 
ordering his deportation, on the grounds that native law and custom required it. After a number 
of unsuccessful habeas corpus applications had been made to courts in Nigeria, the case came on 
appeal to the Privy Council a second time in March 1931, whose judgment was given by Lord 
Atkin. The court found for the applicant, in a judgment which was not simply a formal finding 
that the Governor had acted ultra vires.
203
 Atkin rejected the crown’s argument that it was bound 
to accept as conclusive the Governor’s judgment that Eleko had been properly deposed, and that 
there was a native law or custom requiring his removal. As he explained, the Governor’s powers 
in this matter were simply executive, and ‘no member of the executive can interfere with the 
liberty or property of a British subject except on condition that he can support the legality of his 
action before a court of justice.’204 He further rejected the crown’s argument that it was the 
Governor, and not the members of the ruling house, who appointed and removed chiefs. Since 
such a contention ‘may seriously affect the rights of natives in Nigeria’, its validity could only be 
established by examining the constitutional usage in Nigeria. Only by doing so could the court 
reconcile ‘the existence of the suggested powers with the ‘rights of the native communities’.205 
Once the case was remitted to Nigeria, the authorities decided to release Eleko. As this case 
showed, judges did not always favour the executive’s powers to detain, and did not always weigh 
the legality of detention in purely formal terms. 
 
There were also some decisions which took a broad view of the reach of writ. This can be seen 
from the case of Andrew Mwenya, one of the 61 activists and trade unionists who had been 
excluded from the Copper Belt in Northern Rhodesia, by virtue of Restriction Orders issued 
under the Emergency Powers Regulations, 1956.
206
 In 1959, he had sought a writ of habeas 
corpus against the Colonial Secretary, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and the District 
Commissioner of Mporokoso, the place to which he had been restricted, claiming that the 
restrictions were ultra vires, since the parent Order in Council under which they were issued had 
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not been validly published. Like Sekgoma’s case, this was an application made in London for a 
writ to run to a Protectorate.
207
 The application failed in the Divisional Court, which accepted the 
crown’s objections to the court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ. Lord Parker CJ held that the writ 
could not be issued against the officials in Africa, since it only ran to territories subject to the 
crown, and could not extend to a ‘foreign’ territory, such as a Protectorate, even if the person 
detaining the prisoner was himself a servant of the crown.
208
 He also held that it could not be 
issued against the Colonial Secretary in London, since he did not have sufficient control over 
Mwenya to be subject to the writ.
209
 In taking this view, the court did not explore the question 
raised in the cases of Barnardo and O’Brien, whether there was evidence that the Colonial 
Secretary had de facto control,
210
 preferring to focus on the jurisdictional questions which had 
also occupied the court in Sekgoma’s case. 
 
The Court of Appeal however allowed the appeal (paving the way for the case to be heard on its 
merits)
211
 after deciding that ‘if upon a proper investigation of the facts, it appears that the 
internal governance of Northern Rhodesia is in legal effect indistinguishable from that of a 
British colony or a country acquired by conquest,’ then the writ would run against officials on 
the Protectorate.
212
 In taking this view, the judges were very alive to the importance of the writ 
for liberty. As Romer LJ perceived: 
 
The contrary view would result in a subject having no redress at all if he were detained, 
however unlawfully, in a protectorate which was in substance a colony but which had no 
effective courts of its own. ... For myself I do not believe that the right of the sovereign to 
inquire into the liberty of her subjects depends on a narrow distinction between territory 
which is part of Her Majesty’s dominions in substance and territory which has become 
part of her dominions in fact by a formal act of annexation.
213
 
 
In the event, the court did not have to decide the complex question of whether there was a court 
with jurisdiction in Northern Rhodesia, or whether the 1939 Order in Council had been validly 
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issued, for the restriction orders were revoked on 20 October.
214
 
 
The question of the reach of the writ, and how it can be used to challenge the legality of 
renditions, has been revisited recently by the Supreme Court in Rahmatullah v The Secretary of 
State for Defence, where the court spent some time considering the cases of Barnardo, Sekgoma, 
and O’Brien. The case shows how in the contemporary era, where international human rights 
norms have greater purchase in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts than in the era studied in 
this article,
215
 courts may take a broader view of questions of legality than was often the case 
previously, but that similar dilemmas about the issue of control may persist. Yunus Rahmatullah, 
a Pakistani national, was arrested by British troops in February 2004, in a house in Baghdad. 
Soon afterwards, he was handed over to the US military, who transferred him to a detention 
facility at Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan. After six years in detention, the US military 
concluded in a review that Rahmatullah was not an ‘enduring security threat’, that his continued 
detention was not necessary and that he should be transferred to Pakistan for release. He was 
however kept in custody while the US sought ‘appropriate security assurances’ from Pakistan 
that he would not pose a threat once released, and in May 2011 an application was made in 
London for a writ of habeas corpus to the Secretary of State and the Foreign Secretary to secure 
his release.
216
 Rahmatullah’s initial detention had not been unlawful, nor had it been unlawful 
(under the Geneva Conventions) for the British to hand him over to the Americans.
217
 However, 
once it became apparent that his detention was no longer necessary, and that the Americans 
would not release him, the British came under an obligation - under both international and 
domestic law - to ‘correct the situation’ or request his return.218 
 
The case raised issues pertaining to the reach of the writ and its capacity to test the legality of the 
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detention, as well as to the kinds of questions regarding control which were raised in Barnardo’s 
case and O’Brien’s case. Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court accepted that the writ 
could be used to test the legality of the detention of anyone under the control of the UK 
government, regardless of whether they were a British national or were being held in any 
dominion of the crown.
219
 The courts also agreed that the writ could be used, given that 
Rahmatullah’s continued detention had become unlawful, even though his initial detention and 
rendition had not been so. In doing so, they took a broad view of the power of the writ to test the 
legality of the detention. Insofar as Rahmatullah had never been illegally in the custody of the 
British, and that the aim of the litigation was to force the government to comply with its 
obligations under the Geneva Conventions to seek his return, it might have appeared that a 
different kind of remedy would have been more suitable than habeas corpus.
220
 However, the 
court was prepared to grant the remedy by habeas corpus - potentially a more powerful one - 
without getting caught up in technicalities. As Lord Carnwarth and Baroness Hale put it, ‘The 
strength of habeas corpus is its simplicity.’221 In taking this view, the court took a broader view 
of the scope of the writ than their predecessors had done in Barnardo v Ford, but one of which 
the contemporary critics of that judgment might have approved. 
 
When it came to the issue of control, both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court rejected 
the crown’s argument that since they had no legal control over Rahmatullah, the writ should not 
issue, just as similar arguments had been rejected in O’Brien. The Court of Appeal ordered that it 
should issue, since there was at least uncertainty over whether a request to the Americans to 
return him would be adhered to.
222
 As a result, the UK authorities wrote a formal letter to the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of the US government, informing them both of the court’s 
decision and their intention to appeal against it, and requesting Rahmatullah’s transfer to UK 
custody in order for him to be released. A reply was sent on 8 February, in which the US 
authorities explained their procedures for releasing detainees such as Rahmatullah. The letter did 
not contain any direct refusal to hand him over, and ended with a sentence looking forward ‘to 
discussing this matter further’. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal held that this letter did clear up 
any factual ambiguities and that a sufficient return had been made to the writ. In coming to this 
decision, the court accepted the ‘unequivocal evidence’ of the recipients of the letter - officials in 
the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office - ‘that in the world of 
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international relations the letter amounts to a refusal to hand over the applicant’. The court was 
clearly wary of ‘dictating to the FCO or the MoD as to how to communicate with a foreign 
government’, but felt that the writ had at least performed ‘its minimum function of requiring the 
UK Government to account for its responsibility for the applicant’s detention, and to attempt to 
get him released’.223 In taking this ‘narrow’ approach to the question of testing the degree of 
control, the Court of Appeal echoed the sensitivities which judges have long expressed, in 
seeking to avoid making decisions which would impact on the conduct of foreign policy, an area 
of executive activity long considered to be non-justiciable.
224
  
 
On this political question, the Supreme Court noted that in issuing the writ, the court was not 
asking the government to ‘make any particular diplomatic move’, but only to show why, as a 
matter of fact, it was impossible to obtain the detainee’s release.225 They were not treading into 
territory traditionally seen as not being justiciable. Nonetheless, the majority agreed that the 
Court of Appeal had been right not to require any further testing of the accuracy of the return, 
and that the letter had been conclusive. They were clearly not prepared to go as far, in testing the 
accuracy of the return, as their predecessors had done in Barnardo v Ford. However, two of the 
justices in the Supreme Court (Carnwarth and Hale) dissented on the finding that the return was 
adequate, feeling that the court should have gone further in testing the degree of control.
226
 It 
may be suggested that the dissenters had a good point. The ‘minimalist’ approach to testing the 
accuracy of the return certainly contrasts strikingly with the kind of ‘maximalist’ approach taken 
in Margaret Aylward’s case and that of Dr Barnardo. The judges in those cases were, as has been 
seen, very keen to ensure that nothing be done to ‘baffle’ the court in its protection of liberty, and 
to ensure that the rule of law is complied with. Moreover, as can be seen from the cases of 
Sekgoma and Zaghlul, the political story told to the courts does not always give the full picture; 
and that when it comes to matters of liberty, it is often wise to ask more questions. 
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